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1  
PROTECTIVE PLAN PROVISIONS FOR EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS  
 
Kathryn J. Kennedy* 
 
 Federal case law has provided plan sponsors of the  
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)  
covered plans with the ability to insert plan provisions that are 
more favorable to the plan sponsor rather than the plan  
participant or beneficiary (so-called “protective plan provisions”).  
This Article first examines what is the “plan document” for  
purposes of ERISA and what protective plan provisions should 
be considered for insertion into the plan document and its  
related “instruments.” 
 
  
                                                
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.  Juris Doctorate, 
Northwestern University School of Law, 1980.  Special thanks to my research 
assistants Andrew Scott and Benjamin Lee for their excellent support in this 
endeavor. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal case law has broadened the right of employee  
benefit plan sponsors to insert plan provisions that are more  
favorable to the sponsor than to the plan participants or  
beneficiaries.  This Article examines those so-called “protective 
plan provisions,” both in the retirement and in the welfare plan 
context.  Before reviewing such provisions, it is important to  
understand what constitutes a “plan document” for ERISA’s  
Title I purposes, and to the extent there are single or multiple 
plan documents, to understand what provisions should be  
considered in a plan document for enforcement purposes.  This 
Article is divided into three parts: (1) what constitutes the plan 
document and for what purpose; (2) what specific “instruments” 
could be considered in the plan document or an instrument 
which governs the plan, and what problems develop if those  
instruments are not consistent with the plan document; and (3) 
what protective plan provisions should be considered for  
insertion into the plan documents and related instruments. 
There are two important contexts in which the plan and 
other “instruments” must be identified.  ERISA provides a cause 
of action under Section 501(a)(1)(B) for participants to receive 
benefit payments required “under the terms of [the] plan.”1  
Hence, the terms of the plan are relevant in determining such 
benefit payments.2  ERISA also requires the plan fiduciary to act 
“in accordance with the documents and instruments governing 
the plan”3 or face a breach of fiduciary claim under the prudent  
person standard under ERISA Section 502(a)(2).4  Thus, the plan  
                                                
1 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
2 Id. (providing a cause of action by the participant or beneficiary “to recover 
benefits due to him under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the 
plan[.]”). 
3 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D) (following documents and instruments governing the plan 
is required to the extent those documents and instruments are consistent with the 
provisions of Title I and IV). 
4 Id. at § 1132(a)(2) (providing for a cause of action for appropriate relief under 
ERISA § 409, which imposes personal liability on a plan fiduciary who breaches any 
 
KENNEDYFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:50  PM  
4      BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 18.1 
fiduciary must know what “document and instruments”  
constitute the plan document, as there are numerous  
instruments that may be used in administering the plan, as well 
as the terms of those multiple plan documents.  There is a third 
cause of action under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) that permits the  
participant beneficiary or fiduciary to enjoin acts that violate the 
terms of the plan or ERISA Title I, to redress the violation, or to 
enforce the terms of the plan or ERISA Title I.5  This is a broad 
cause of action covering claims to enforce rights under the plan, 
including rights to benefits, and statutory rights. 
II.  WHAT IS A “PLAN DOCUMENT” UNDER ERISA? 
 Under ERISA’s “General Provisions,” Section 3 contains  
definition provisions.6  While the section defines what  
constitutes an employee benefit plan, it does not define what 
constitutes the plan document or instrument establishing such 
plan.7  
A.    Requirements of ERISA Section 402 
 ERISA Section 402 is the closest relevant provision  
because it requires that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be 
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument” 
(i.e., the plan document).8  Under the law’s “Fiduciary  
Responsibility” provisions, ERISA Section 402 mandates that 
the content of that plan document include certain items.9  First, 
the plan must name at least one fiduciary (i.e., the named  
fiduciary) and the procedure by which an employer, employee, or 
                                                                                                       
fiduciary duties to restore plan losses or disgorge any profits made through the use of 
plan assets). 
5 Id. at § 1132(a)(3). 
6 Id. at § 1002(3). 
7 See id. (“the term ‘employee benefit plan’ or ‘plan’ means an employee welfare 
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee 
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.”). 
8 29 U.S.C. § 1102. 
9 Id. at § 1102(a)-(b). 
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organization identify a fiduciary with respect to such plan.10   
Second, the plan must set forth the “procedure for establishing 
and carrying out a funding policy and method” (applicable in the 
retirement plan context) that is consistent with the objectives of 
the plan and the terms of ERISA.11  Third, the plan must  
describe any procedures for allocating “responsibilit[y] for the 
operation and administration of the plan[,]” including the  
procedures for allocating such responsibilities among named  
fiduciaries, and for named fiduciaries to designate other non-
named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities.12  
Fourth, the plan must provide a procedure for amending the 
plan and the identity of the person who has the authority to 
amend the plan.13  Lastly, the plan must “specify the basis on 
which payments are made to [(i.e., contributions)] and from [(i.e., 
benefit payments)] the plan.”14 
 ERISA Section 402 also provides optional provisions to be 
set forth in the plan including: authority for any person or group 
of persons to serve in multiple fiduciary capacities with respect 
to the plan (e.g., trustee and plan administrator);15 authority for 
a named fiduciary or a new fiduciary who has been designated 
by a named fiduciary to carry out fiduciary responsibilities  
under the plan to “employ one or more persons to render advice”  
regarding its responsibilities;16 or authority for a fiduciary 
named to control or manage the assets of the plan to appoint an 
investment manager or multiple investment managers to  
manage the assets of the plan, including the power to acquire 
and dispose of plan assets.17  This type of provision is applicable 
in the retirement plan context, as welfare benefits are typically 
funded on a self-insured, pay-as-you-go basis or with insurance 
                                                
10 Id. at § 1102(a)(1)-(2). 
11 Id. at § 1102(b)(1). 
12 Id. at § 1102(b)(2). 
13 Id. at § 1102(b)(3). 
14 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4). 
15 Id. at § 1102(c)(1). 
16 Id. at § 1102(c)(2). 
17 Id. at § 1102(c)(3). 
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premiums.18  However, multiemployer welfare plans may be 
funded with trusts.19 
 Aside from ERISA Section 402, various other ERISA  
provisions require certain types of plans to contain required 
terms: under ERISA Section 203, pension plans must provide 
minimum vesting standards, which are different for defined 
benefit plans than for defined contribution plans;20 under ERISA 
Section 205, joint and survivor and preretirement survivor  
annuities must be provided to surviving spouses of deceased 
vested participants;21 and under ERISA Section 206, the form 
and timing of benefits under a pension plan are subject to a 
number of caveats that must be set forth in the plan, including 
anti-alienation provisions.22 
Generally, in the retirement plan context, the plan  
document is regarded as a single document with the above-
required provisions, as opposed to multiple documents that  
collectively serve as the plan document in other contexts.  This is 
certainly the case with qualified retirement plans, as employers 
generally submit a single plan document for a determination  
letter to affirm the qualified status of the plan document.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed this concept in the CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara23 decision by stating that ERISA Section 402 requires the 
plan to be established by the plan sponsor who “creates the basic 
terms and conditions of the plan, executes a written instrument 
containing those terms and conditions, and provides in that  
instrument ‘a procedure’ for making amendments.”24  The case 
involved a traditional defined benefit pension plan that was  
                                                
18 Id. at § 1102(c)(1)-(3). 
19 E.g., Boucher v. Williams, 13 F. Supp. 2d 84, 95 (D. Me. 1998); Manny v. Cent. 
States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension & Health & Welfare Funds, 388 F.3d 241, 243 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
20 29 U.S.C. § 1053. 
21 Id. at § 1055(a). 
22 Id. at § 1056. 
23 563 U.S. 421, 438 (2011). 
24 Id. at 437. 
KENNEDYFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:50  PM  
2016]   PROTECTIVE PLAN PROVISIONS 7 
converted to a cash balance retirement plan.25  The Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of conflicting terms between the single 
plan document and the summary plan description, 26 which is 
discussed later in this Section. 
The Supreme Court has also referenced plan documents in 
the plural.27  In Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. and Inv. 
Plan,28 the Court concluded that a benefit claim “stands or falls 
by . . . the directives of the plan documents[.]”29  The case  
involved a former spouse’s waiver of her spousal benefits under 
an ERISA pension plan that was not subject to a qualified  
domestic relations order (QDRO).30  Under the terms of the plan, 
if there were no surviving spouse or designated beneficiary at 
the time of death, benefits would be distributed to the  
participant’s estate.31  The issue presented was whether the plan  
administrator was to follow the terms of the plan in the face of a 
possible federal common-law waiver that did not satisfy as a 
QDRO.32  Similarly, in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,33 
the Court affirmed that ERISA’s statutory “scheme . . . is built 
around reliance on the face of written plan documents[,]”  
referring to plan documents in the plural.34  This was in  
reference to express legislative history that stated “‘[a] written 
plan is to be required in order that every employee may, on  
examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his 
rights and obligations are under the plan,’” (emphasis omitted) 
again referring to plan documents in the plural.35  The case 
                                                
25 Id. at 424. 
26 Id. at 436-38. 
27 See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying discussion. 
28 555 U.S. 285, 286 (2009) (which allows for “‘a uniform administrative scheme, 
[with] a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of 
benefits[,]’” quoting from Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)). 
29 Id. at 300. 
30 Id. at 288. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 291-92. 
33 514 U.S. 73 (1995). 
34 Id. at 83. 
35 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 297 (1974) U.S. Code Cong. &  
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asked whether a postretirement health plan’s standard  
reservation clause constituted a valid amendment procedure for 
purposes of ERISA Section 402(b)(3).36 
Two other ERISA provisions refer to “instruments  
governing the plan”37 or “instruments under which the plan is 
established or operated[,]”38 suggesting that other agreements or 
contracts could set forth terms of the plan.  Under the  
“Reporting and Disclosure Requirements” sections,39 ERISA  
Section 104(b)(4) sets forth certain disclosure requirements  
applicable to the plan administrator.  The administrator must, 
upon written request of any plan participant or beneficiary,  
furnish the most recent summary plan description (SPD), Form 
5500 (an annual return and report of the employee benefit plan), 
terminal reports, collective bargaining agreements, trust  
agreements, contracts, or “other instruments under which the 
plan is established or operated.”40  The latter indicates that  
multiple instruments could constitute parts of the plan  
document.  
Under the “Fiduciary Responsibility” sections,41 ERISA  
Section 404(a)(1)(D) requires a plan fiduciary to discharge his or 
her duties with respect to the plan solely in the interests of the  
participants and beneficiaries “in accordance with the  
documents and instruments governing the plan[.]”42  The  
question arises as to whether the “instruments” referred to in 
these two sections are identical or whether they simply  
overlap.43  In the Curtiss-Wright decision, the Supreme Court 
characterized the documents subject to the disclosure  
                                                                                                       
Admin. News pp. 4639, 5077, 5078 (emphasis added)).  
36 Id. at 75. 
37 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).  
38 Id. at § 1024(b)(4).  
39 Id. at §§ 1021-1031.  
40 Id. at § 1024 (with penalties of $110 per day for failure to comply under 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)).  See also 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-3 (2015). 
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.  
42 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D).  
43 See id. at §§ 1024(a)(6), 1104(a)(1)(D).  
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requirements under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) as the “governing 
plan documents” required under ERISA Section 402(b).44  Their 
purpose is to provide a “clear set of instructions” to participants 
to obtain benefits.45  However, the Supreme Court was solely 
addressing the question of what constitutes the plan documents 
for purposes of the fiduciary requirements of ERISA Section 
402(b)(3).46 
Regulatory guidance and case law may be useful in  
identifying what types of instruments are to be considered for 
either or both purposes under ERISA Sections 104(b)(4) and 
404(a)(1)(D).  Each section will be examined separately.  The  
distinction is important, as ERISA Section 104(b)(4) is a  
disclosure requirement whereby the penalty falls upon the plan 
administrator to pay a fee for failing to disclose, whereas failure 
to comply with ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) creates a participant 
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty to comply with the 
governing plan documents and instruments. 
B.    Plan documents and instruments for ERISA Section 
104(b)(4) purposes 
The Department of Labor (DOL) has issued several advisory 
opinions on what constitutes “‘other instruments under which 
the plan is established or operated’” for purposes of ERISA  
Section 104(b)(4).47  Its first opinion stated that “other  
instruments” include any documents or instrument setting forth 
“procedures, formulas, methodologies, or schedules [used] in  
determining or calculating a participant’s or beneficiary’s benefit 
entitl[ed] under a[] . . . plan[.]”48  This includes any document, or  
                                                
44 See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 83 (noting that “ERISA gives effect to this 
‘written plan documents’ scheme through a comprehensive set of ‘reporting and  
disclosure’ requirements, see 29 U.S.C §§ 1021-1031”). 
45 Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 
283 (7th Cir. 1990). 
46 See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 83-85.  
47 E.g., DOL Adv. Op. 97-11A (Apr. 10, 1997); DOL Adv. Op. 96-14A (July 31, 
1996).  
48 DOL Adv. Op. 96-14A (July 31, 1996). 
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provisions thereof, that “establishes or amends the plan in  
question” or that “establishes a claims procedure.”49  However, it 
does not necessarily include “all contracts between a plan and 
third parties who render services to the plan[,]” which may or 
may not include a third party agreement.50 
Most of the circuits that have opined on the “catch-all” part 
of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) take a strict approach on its  
construction and limit these “other instruments” to formal or  
legal documents under which the plan is established or  
governed.  Accordingly, most circuit courts reject the premise 
that other documents that relate to the plan, such as actuarial 
valuation reports, are not formal legal documents.51  
In Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.,52 the Fourth Circuit 
found the statutory language of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) “clear 
and unambiguous,” and therefore, the court did not need to rely 
upon the legislative history, nor traditional rules of statutory  
construction.53  The court defined “instrument” to mean “‘[a]  
formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, 
will, bond or lease[.]’”54  Thus, “instruments” was defined as  
“encompass[ing] formal or legal documents under which a plan is 
set up or managed.”55  The Fourth Circuit rejected the minority 
approach set forth in the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Bartling v. 
                                                
49 DOL Adv. Op. 97-11A (Apr. 10, 1997). 
50 Id.; Brown v. J.B. Hunt Transport Servs., Inc., 586 F.3d 1079, 1088-89 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (stating that claim manuals or guidelines used in claims procedures are 
not covered); Hively v. BBA Aviation Benefit Plan, 331 Fed. Appx. 510, 511 (9th Cir. 
2009) (stating that the plan’s administrative service agreement may be covered if it 
“governs the relationship between . . . the plan participants and the provider” or  
“‘relate[s] only to the manner in which the plan is operated’”). 
51 Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc., 190 F.3d 856, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1999)  
(limiting disclosure to formal documents that establish or govern the plan, not all 
documents under which the plan conducts operation, thereby rejecting disclosure of 
“corporation actions replacing members of the [plan’s] [a]dministrative [c]ommittee, 
minutes of the [a]dministrative [c]ommittee meetings, and written communications 
with” the plan’s trustee). 
52 91 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1077 (1997). 
53 Id. at 653. 
54 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (6th ed. 1990)). 
55 Id. 
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Fruehauf Corp.56 that suggested courts should favor a  
presumption of disclosure under ERISA Section 104(b)(4)  
because the statutory language did not support such  
presumption.57  Even with its stricter test, the court in Faircloth 
held that the plan’s funding and investment policies were  
disclosable because “[a]s described in the [plan], the funding and 
investment policies set forth [the employer]’s obligations to fund 
the [plan] and explain the responsibilities regarding investing 
the assets of the [plan].”58 
In Bd. Of Trs. of the CWA/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v. 
Weinstein,59 the Second Circuit followed suit and construed  
“instruments” for ERISA Section 104(b)(4) purposes as limited to  
formal legal documents that govern the plan’s operation, in  
contrast with routine documents with which the plan conducts 
its operations, citing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Faircloth.60  
The Eighth Circuit in Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc.61 agreed 
with the narrow interpretation of “instruments” to “only formal 
documents that establish or govern the plan.”62  The Seventh  
Circuit in Ames v. Am. Nat’l Can Co.63 concurred with its sister 
circuits, noting that a contrary “interpretation would make hash 
of the statutory language, which on its face refers to a specific 
set of documents: those under which a plan is established or  
                                                
56 29 F.3d 1062, 1072 (6th Cir. 1994).  
57 91 F.3d at 654-56 (rejecting disclosure of the IRS determination letter, the 
plan’s bonding policy, the ESOP plan’s appraisal reports and supporting  
documentation, the minutes of the plan meetings, and the cost-sharing and trustee 
expense policies, but allowing disclosure of the plan’s funding and investment  
policies). 
58 Id. at 656. 
59 107 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1997). 
60 Id. at 142.  
61 190 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting disclosure of documents relating the 
replacement of the members of the ESOP administrative committee, minutes of  
administrative committee meetings, or written communications with the plan’s  
trustee). 
62 Id. at 861. 
63 170 F.3d 751, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting disclosure of the agreement to 
sell a division to a successor employer, certain division board resolutions, and names 
of individual fiduciaries). 
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operated.”64  The First Circuit in Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co.65  
interpreted instruments as “formal legal documents that  
underpin the plan” thereby rejecting disclosure of mental health 
guidelines because the plan administrator “was not bound to use 
them, nor did patients have any legal rights under them.”66 
In contrast, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have construed 
the reach of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) more broadly.67  In 
Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp.,68 in connection with a pending sale, 
the employer informed plan participants of the replacement of 
their existing pension plan with a new plan by providing a letter 
with employment data used to calculate vested benefits upon 
plan termination.69  Counsel for the participant plaintiffs  
requested the plan’s determination letter, actuarial reports for 
the past three years, benefit computation sheets, and a portion 
of the purchase agreement that related to plan benefits.70  The 
Sixth Circuit held that disclosure of the actuarial reports is  
required under ERISA Section 103(d) to be filed every third year 
of the plan, and thus are “indispensable to the operation of the 
plan.”71  The court reasoned that the purpose behind ERISA’s 
disclosure rules was “to ensure that ‘the individual participant 
knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan,’”  
quoting the language in the Supreme Court’s Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Bruch decision.72  The court advocated for a  
presumption in “favor” of disclosure so as to assist participants 
in understanding their rights.73  The court also required  
disclosure of the calculation procedure without explicit  
                                                
64 Id. at 758. 
65 167 F.3d 53, 60 (1999). 
66 Id.  
67 See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying discussion.  
68 29 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1994). 
69 Id. at 1065. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 1070. 
72 Id. (quoting Firestone v. Bruch 489 U.S. 101, 118 (1989), which had quoted 
from the legislative history at H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 11 (1973)). 
73 Id.  
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reasoning.74  
In Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Comm. v.  
Admin’r of the Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan,75  
retirees under the pension plan requested the plan  
administrator furnish the names and addresses of other plan 
participants.76  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
denial for such request under ERISA Section 104(b)(4), stating 
that the ordinary meaning of the statute “limits the universe of 
documents falling within that phrase to documents similar in 
nature to those specifically identified,” describing the terms and 
conditions of the plan or the plan’s administration and financial 
status.77  The court concluded that a list of plan participants 
provided no information about the plan.78  Relying on the  
legislative history, the documents requiring disclosure under 
ERISA Section 104(b)(4) include those that permit  
“the individual participant [to] know[] exactly 
where he stands with respect to the plan[,] what 
benefits he may be entitled to, what circumstances 
may preclude him from obtaining benefits, what 
procedures he must follow to obtain benefits, and 
who are the persons to whom the management and 
investment of his plan funds have been  
entrusted.”79   
The Ninth Circuit clarified its interpretation in Shaver v.  
Operating Eng’rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund,80 stating that 
                                                
74 Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1071.  
75 72 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1995).  See also Shaver v. Operating Eng’rs Local 428 
Pension Trust Fund, 332 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “other  
instruments” refers to “legal documents that describe the terms of the plan, its  
financial status, and other documents that restrict or govern the plan’s operation” 
such that itemized list of plan expenditures do not have to be disclosed because they 
“relate only to the manner in which the plan is operated.”). 
76 Id. at 688. 
77 Id. at 689. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 690 (quoting the legislative history at S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C. C.A.N. 4838, 4863). 
80 332 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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“instruments” for ERISA Section 104(b)(4) was confined to “legal  
documents that describe the terms of the plan, [the plan’s]  
financial status, and other documents that restrict or govern the 
plan’s operation.”81  Other district courts have allowed ancillary 
documents such as a stock valuation report to measure benefits 
by the value of the stock82 and a manual with charts necessary 
for the calculation of benefits.83 
C.    Plan documents and instruments for ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(D) purposes 
ERISA Section 404(a)(1) sets forth ERISA’s fiduciary  
standards of care.84  ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(A) requires the  
fiduciary to act “for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing  
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying 
reasonable expenses of administrating the plan[.]”85  ERISA  
Section 404(a)(1)(D) requires fiduciaries to act “in accordance 
with the documents and instruments governing the plan” to the 
extent they are consistent with ERISA, making reference to  
multiple documents and instruments.86  ERISA Section 404(a)(1) 
uses the phrase “documents and instruments governing the 
plan[,]”87 whereas ERISA Section 104(b)(4) uses the phrase  
“instruments under which the plan is established or operated.”88 
A few courts have addressed two questions: whether  
“instruments” under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) are the same as  
“documents and instruments” under ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(D),89 and whether ERISA Section 404(a)(1) imposes  
additional disclosure obligations beyond those found in ERISA 
                                                
81 Id. at 1202. (rejecting disclosure of a list of plan expenditures as they “relate 
only to the manner in which the plan is operated.”). 
82 See Werner v. Morgan Equip. Co., 15 EBC 2295, 2301 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
83 See Lee v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 604 F. Supp. 987, 1002 (S.D. Ohio 1985). 
84 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  
85 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(A). 
86 Id. at § 1104(a)(1)(D).  
87 Id.  
88 Id. at § 1024(b)(4). 
89 See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying discussion.  
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Section 104(b)(4).90  
The Ninth Circuit in Hughes Salaried Retirees Action 
Comm. v. Admin. of the Hughes Non-Bargaining  
Retirement Plan91 affirmed its earlier ruling in Acosta v. Pacific 
Enters.92 that any disclosure required under ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(A) was limited to information that relates to the  
provision of benefits or the defrayment of expenses.93  The court 
held that the disclosure of names and addresses of participants 
was not required under either ERISA Sections 404(a)(1)(A) or 
104(b)(4), and that it did not have to address the issue of the  
relationship between ERISA Sections 404(a)(1) and 104(b)(4) as 
to whether documents were not disclosable under ERISA  
Section 104(b)(4), but arguably disposable under ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(A).94  
The Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Plan Admin. for DuPont 
Savings and Investment Plan95 had the opportunity to define the 
category of “‘documents and instruments governing’” the plan for  
purposes of ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D).96  In that case, a  
participant died unmarried, and the terms of the plan called for 
the distribution of benefits to be made to his estate.97  Prior to 
his death, the participant had married and named his spouse as 
beneficiary to the benefits, but upon their subsequent divorce in 
which his spouse waived her rights to his benefits, the  
participant did not remove his former spouse as beneficiary on 
                                                
90 See infra notes 110-121 and accompanying discussion.  
91 72 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1995).  
92 950 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991). 
93 Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Committee v. Administrator of the Hughes 
Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan, 72 F.3d 686, 694 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Acosta v. 
Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
94 Id. at 694-95. 
95 555 U.S. at 285, 300 (reinforcing the mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) 
“that a participant or beneficiary may bring a cause of action ’to recover benefits due 
to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[]’”). 
96 Id. at 288.  
97 Id. at 289. 
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the plan’s designation form.98  The participant’s estate claimed 
the benefits that had been paid to the former spouse.99  The  
Supreme Court declined to rule as to whether beneficiary  
designation forms were “‘documents and instruments governing 
the plan’” under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), as the terms of the 
plan and summary plan description, both of which were  
“‘documents and instruments governing the plan[,]’” directed the 
plan administrator to pay benefits to the participant’s  
designated beneficiary.100 
The Ninth Circuit recently ruled on this issue.101  In the 
case of Becker v. Williams,102 a participant had designated his 
spouse as beneficiary under the plan, but upon his divorce,  
attempted to change the beneficiary designation to his son 
through a telephone conversation instead of signing and  
returning the required form as required by the plan.103  The  
district court granted the former spouse’s motion for summary 
judgment and declined, upon a subsequent motion by the  
decedent’s son, to reconsider its judgment.104  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the beneficiary designation forms were 
not “plan documents” for purposes of ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(D).105  Drawing on guidance from the Hughes Salaried 
Retirees Action Comm. case, the court interpreted “instruments” 
for ERISA Section 104(b)(4) purposes as only “‘those documents 
that provide individual participants with information about the 
                                                
98 Id. at 290. 
99 Id. at 304. 
100 Id.  Only one court of appeals had addressed this issue prior to the Kennedy 
decision.  In the case of McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp. 423 F.3d 241, 245-46 (3d Cir. 
2005), the Third Circuit suggested that virtually all “documents on file with the 
[P]lan[,]” including beneficiary designation forms, fit within the “‘documents and  
instruments governing the plan[.]’” 
101 Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015).  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 1036-37. 
104 Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, Becker v. Mays-Williams, 
No. C11-5830, 2012 WL 6150561, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2012), recons’d denied, 
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for reconsideration, Becker v. Williams, No. C11-
5830, 2013 WL 241370, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2013). 
105 See Becker, 777 F.3d at 1039-40. 
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plan and benefits.’”106  The court further interpreted “those  
documents” as documents necessary to tell “‘exactly where [the 
participant] stands with respect to the plan—what benefits he 
may be entitled to, what circumstances may preclude him from  
obtaining benefits, what procedures he must follow to obtain 
benefits . . . .’”107  Although the Supreme Court in Kennedy  
suggested that the “instruments” in ERISA Section 104(b)(4) 
may overlap with the “documents and instruments governing 
the plan” in ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(d), the category described 
in ERISA Section 404 is even narrower than that of ERISA  
Section 104.108  The court remarked that this result is due to the 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara decision, in which the Supreme Court 
excluded the statutory mandated summary plan description 
listed in ERISA Section 104 as a source of the plan’s governing 
terms.109 
As to the second issue, a few courts have addressed the  
issue of whether ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) creates additional  
disclosure obligations beyond those found in ERISA Section 
104(b)(4).110  The Fourth Circuit in the Faircloth decision  
(discussed above) held that ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) did not 
impose additional disclosure obligations beyond those imposed 
by ERISA Section 104(b)(4), but the court did not resolve the  
issue as to whether the “instruments” were the same under both  
provisions.111  The Ninth Circuit in Shaver v. Operating  
Eng’rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund112 held that disclosure of 
certain plan expenditures was not required under ERISA  
Section 104(b)(4) as “instruments,” and as such, was not the  
                                                
106 Id. at 1039. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1039-40. 
109 Id. at 1039 n. 3 (citing the Supreme Court’s case of CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 
131 S.Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (“[T]he summary documents, important as they are,  
provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but . . . their statements do 
not themselves constitute the terms.”). 
110 See infra notes 117-121 and accompanying discussion.   
111 See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 658. 
112 332 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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basis for a breach of fiduciary claim, indicating that the  
“instruments” covering both the disclosure and fiduciaries 
standards were similar or identical.113  The Fifth Circuit raised 
the issue in Murphy v. Verizon Communication, Inc.,114 but  
rendered it moot, as the appellants had already received their  
required relief.115  However, the court in Murphy pointed out the 
tension in its prior decisions.116  In Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. 
Health Plan of Tex.,117 the court held that ERISA Section 
404(a)(1) “should not add to [a] specific disclosure requirement[]” 
that ERISA already provides,118 whereas in Kujanek v. Houston 
Poly Bag I, Ltd.,119 the court held that a plan administrator 
breaches its fiduciary duties by withholding plan documents and 
rollover information that was specifically requested by a  
participant.120  The administrator in Murphy breached its duties 
when it  “‘failed to act in [the plan participant’s] best interest 
and “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to  
participants[,]”’ as required by Section 404(a)(1).”121 
The lessons learned from this case law are as follows: to the 
extent certain documents are regarded as “instruments” relating 
to the plan document, the protective plan provisions discussed in 
the second part of this Article should be inserted into all related 
documents if the plan sponsor wishes to reduce litigation over 
the issue. 
 
 
 
                                                
113 Id. at 1202. 
114 587 Fed. Appx. 140 (5th Cir. 2014). 
115 Id. at 146. 
116 Id. at 147. 
117 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000). 
118 Id. at 555-56. 
119 658 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2011). 
120 Id. at 488-89. 
121 Murphy v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 13-11117, Appeal from U.S. Dis. Ct. for the 
N. Dis. Tex. at 13 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014). 
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III.  WHAT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS SUCH AS INSURANCE 
POLICIES, TRUST AGREEMENTS, INVESTMENT POLICY 
STATEMENTS, AND SPDS ARE CONSIDERED PLAN 
DOCUMENTS OR INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE PLAN? 
The next part addresses the specific issues as to whether  
certain documents, such as an insurance policy, a trust  
agreement, an investment policy statement, and an SPD are 
considered plan documents or related instruments, and for what 
purposes.  
A.    Insurance Policies as Plan Documents 
On the health and welfare side, if the benefits are insured, 
there may only be an insurance policy or contract rather than a 
separate plan document.122  The issue of whether the insurance 
policy may constitute the plan document generally arises in two 
contexts: in a cause of action for eligibility of policy benefits, or 
under the standard of review for determining eligibility for  
benefits, both under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).123  The Eighth 
Circuit in Ibson v. United Healthcare Services, Inc.124 held that 
an insurance policy alone constituted a plan document because it 
met the requirements of identifying “‘(1) the intended benefits, 
(2) the class of beneficiaries, (3) a source of funding, and (4) the 
procedures for receiving benefits.’”125  These four requirements 
address two of the standards of ERISA Sections 402(b)(1) and 
402(b)(4), namely the procedure for establishing and carrying 
out a funding policy and deciding how benefits are to be paid, 
but not the two other requirements relating to procedures for  
                                                
122 Ibson v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 776 F.3d 941, 944 (8th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2351 (2015) (“‘[A]n employer’s purchase of an insurance policy 
to provide health care benefits for its employees can constitute an Employee Welfare 
Benefit Plan for ERISA purposes.’”) (quoting Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 368 
(8th Cir. 1994).  
123 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  
124 776 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2014). 
125 Id. at 944. (quoting Petersen v. E.F. Johnson Co., 366 F.3d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 
2004)). 
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allocating responsibilities for the operation and administration 
of the plan, and for amending such plan.126 
The typical scenario in which the question arises is in the 
context of the court’s standard of review regarding a plan  
administrator’s denial of a benefit claim.127  Generally, the 
standard of review in a benefits denial claim is de novo, unless 
the plan administrator has been granted discretionary authority 
under the plan to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe 
the terms of the plan.128  If there is no plan document—as is the 
case for many insured welfare plans—courts look to other  
related documents for such grants of discretion.129  The issue is 
critical, as courts routinely affirm the benefits denial of the plan 
administrator if the administrator has the requisite  
discretionary power.130 
If there is an insurance policy that provides for the payment 
of employer-sponsored benefits in lieu of a separate plan  
document, the question that then arises is whether the  
insurance policy can confer such discretionary authority to the 
                                                
126 29 U.S.C. §1102(b).  
127 See Moberly v. Metlife, No. CIV.A. 6:06-297DCR, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order at 6  (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2007); Stewart v. Bell Atl. Long Term Disability Plan 
for Mgmt. Employees, No. 12 C 6175 at 11-12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2013); Frerichs v. 
Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 923, 938 (D. Minn. 2012); Baker v. 
Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 4:14-CV-209-BLW at 6-7 (D. Idaho Feb. 23, 2015); 
Cleary v. Boeing Co. Employee Health & Welfare Ben. Plan (Plan 503), No. 11-CV-
00403-WJM-BNB at 11 (D. Colo. July 31, 2013); Harvey v. Standard Ins. Co., 850 F. 
Supp. 2d 1269, 1276 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Bell v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 589 F. Supp. 
2d 1268, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2008); Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 
699 F. Supp. 2d 185, 198 (D.D.C. 2010); LeBlanc v. Sullivan Tire Co., 526 F. Supp. 2d 
75, 79 (D. Me. 2007); Gates v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 11-CV-3487 (KBF) at 
20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014); Smith v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, No. CIV.A. 
TDC-14-0203 at 4 (D. Md. Mar. 3, 2015); Parkridge Med. Ctr., Inc. v. CPC Logistics, 
Inc. Grp. Ben. Plan, No. 1:12-CV-124 at 8 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2013).  
128 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 
129 Tuttle v. Varian Med. Sys. Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 944, 949 (D. Ariz. 2013)  
(turning to the insurance policy itself as the plan document); Frazier v. Life Ins. Co. 
of N. Am., 725 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2013) (characterizing the insurance policy as 
both a plan asset and the plan document).   
130 Tuttle, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 956 (holding that the plan documents, consisting of 
various portions of the policy, “granted discretionary authority to the decisionmaker” 
and affirming the use of that authority); Frazier, 725 F.3d at 571 (affirming the claim 
denial).  
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plan fiduciary.  Several circuits have affirmed use of the  
insurance policy as sufficient to determine a grant of  
discretionary authority to the plan administrator to avoid the de 
novo standard of review.131  Four circuits have addressed the  
issue of whether discretionary authority that is not present in 
the insurance policy, but appeared in either a certificate of  
insurance or a summary plan description, is sufficient.132  The 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits did not rely on these  
external documents to confer discretionary authority when the 
insurance policy was silent,133 but the Second Circuit affirmed 
the grant of discretionary authority through the summary plan 
description.134  However, the Second Circuit case is a pre-Amara 
decision and may be decided differently today.135  
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) adopted a model act in 2002 entitled “Prohibition on the 
Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act,” prohibiting the use of 
discretionary clauses in health insurance policies beginning in 
                                                
131 Frazier v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 725 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2013); Ruiz v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 400 F.3d 986, 991-92 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming the grant 
of discretionary authority to the plan administrator in the certificate for insurance); 
Ross v. Rail Car Am. Group Disability Income Plan, 285 F.3d 735, 739 n. 5 (8th Cir. 
2002); Cinelli v. Sec. Pac. Corp., 61 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995); Gable v.  
Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994); Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861 
F.2d 897, 900-01 (6th Cir. 1988); Shaw v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 1276, 
1282-83 (11th Cir. 2003). 
132 Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Shaw v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 353 F.3d 1276, 
1282 (11th Cir. 2003); Sperandeo v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 460 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 
2006); Murphy v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 23 F3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 1994).  
133 See Grosz-Salomon, 237 F.3d at 1158-61 (where the underlying policy  
provided that “‘[t]his policy and any application made by the policyholder or by an 
employee make up the entire contract between the parties,’”); Shaw, 353 F.3d at 
1283 (where the underlying policy stated “[n]o change in this contract will be valid 
unless approved by the Insurance Company and evidenced by endorsement on this 
contract or by amendments to this contract”); Sperandeo, 460 F.3d at 871 (noting 
that the certificate and summary plan description were “not incorporated by  
reference into the policy or plan”).  
134 See Murphy v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 23 F3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 1994)  
(affirming the grant of discretionary authority pursuant to the summary plan  
description and the employee information package, with no explanation as to the 
terms of the underlying severance plan). 
135 See discussion infra Section III.D.  
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2002.136   The NAIC then amended its model act in 2004 to apply 
to disability insurance policies.137  As a result, some state  
insurance departments have prohibited insurers from using  
discretionary clauses in their insurance policies, either health 
insurance, disability insurance, or both, on the grounds that 
they are illusory.138  Three circuits—the Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth—have held that such state insurance laws prohibiting 
discretionary clauses in insurance policies are not preempted by 
ERISA.139  Thus, such insurance policies may not grant  
discretionary authority to the insurer.140  To avoid both the de 
novo standard of review and preemption challenges for  
employer-sponsored coverage under such insurance policies, the 
policy should include a grant of discretionary authority to a  
person other than the insurer, for example, the employer.141 
B.    Trust Agreements as Plan Documents 
The next document to be considered as a possible plan  
document is the trust agreement.  ERISA Section 403 requires 
that the assets of an employee benefit plan be held in trust by 
                                                
136 HEALTH INS. & MANAGED CARE (B) COMMITTEE, 2002 NAIC PROC. 1ST Qtr. p. 
175, 180-181. 
137 HEALTH INS. & MANAGED CARE (B) COMMITTEE, 2004 NAIC PROC. 3RD Qtr. 
(Attachment 1) “Prohibition on the Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act,” at 673, 
677. 
138 See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §10110.6(a) (2012); COL. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1116(2) 
(2008); Conn. Ins. Dep’t Bull. HC-67 (Mar. 19, 2008); Haw. Commissioner’s Memo. 
2004-13H (Dec. 8, 2004); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 18.01.29.011 (2011); 50 ILL. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 50 § 2001.3 (2005); Ind. Dep’t of Ins., Bull. 103 (May 8, 2001); Ky. Dep’t of 
Ins., Adv. Op. 2010-01 (Mar. 9, 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4303 (2011); 
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-211 (2005); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.500.2202 (2016); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 33-1-502 (2011); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-58.1 et seq. (2010); N.Y.  
Circular Letter No. 2006-14, NEW YORK INSURANCE BULLETINS AND RELATED 
MATERIALS (June 29, 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.005 (2011); S.D. Admin. R. § 
20:06:52:02 (2010); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1202 et seq. (2010); UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
r.590-218 (2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 284-44-015, 46-015, 96-012 (2012); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 26-13-304 (1977). 
139 American Council of Life Ins. v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883, 886-887 (7th Cir. 2015); and 
Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2009). 
140 Zaccone v. Standard Life Ins. Co., No.-10-CV 00033 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2013).  
141 See Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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one or more trustees “pursuant to a written trust instrument,” 
referred to as the “hold-in-trust” requirement.142  It specifies 
that the trustee is to be named in either the trust instrument or 
plan instrument, but may be appointed by a person who is a 
named fiduciary.143  “[T]he trustee or trustees . . . have [the]  
exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the  
assets of the plan” (referred to as the exclusive control  
requirements).144  The terms “trust,” “trustee,” and “trust  
instrument” are not found in ERISA’s “Definitions” section.145  
The existence of a trust is typically seen in the retirement plan 
context where employer and employee contributions are  
pre-funded and are thus in need of a tax-exempt trust and,  
consequently, a trust document.146  It is not necessarily found in 
the insured welfare plan context, but may exist if the welfare 
plan is collectively bargained.147  
ERISA Section 104(b)(4) enumerates the “trust agreement”  
separately from the plan document, and considers it a written 
instrument under which the plan is established or governed.148  
Under ERISA’s fiduciary standards, trustees as plan fiduciaries 
must comply with the terms of the trust agreement or face 
breach of fiduciary claim cases.149 This raises the issue of  
whether the trust agreement needs to be a separate document 
from the plan document or whether it can be incorporated into 
                                                
142 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (unless the plan subjects the trustee or trustees to the direction of a 
named fiduciary who is not a trustee or allows the trustee or trustees to delegate 
powers to manage, acquire or dispose of plan assets to an investment manager).  Id. 
at § 1103(a)(1). 
145 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3 (2015). 
146 David A. Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Retiree Health Benefits, 3 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 103, 128 (2007). 
147 See, e.g., Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 
311, 322 (1998). 
148 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (requiring furnishing of “a copy of the latest updated 
summary, plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the 
bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which 
the plan is established or operated.”). 
149 Id. at §§ 1104(a), 1109. 
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the base plan document.  If the trust is a separate document 
from the foundational “plan document,” it is considered a written  
instrument under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) under which the plan 
is established or governed.150 
The DOL regulations echo the statute, but further provide 
that “all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust 
by one or more trustees pursuant to a written trust  
instrument.”151  In an amicus brief, the DOL takes the position 
that the language in ERISA Section 403, “‘all assets of an  
employee benefit plan shall be held in trust[,]’” requires the  
execution of a separate trust document or separate written  
document governing the plan that clearly expresses an intent to 
create a trust.152  Only then can a named or appointed trustee 
accept appointment and exclusively hold the plan assets for the 
benefit of the participants and beneficiaries.153  The Department 
of Justice (DOJ) argues that because “[t]he statute clearly  
contemplates the formal execution of a trust instrument and the 
appointment of trustees,” and that DOJ regulations reflect that 
fact, it should be afforded deference.154  The DOL rejects the  
argument that the plan document can serve as a written trust 
instrument because trust principles require the trustees,  
beneficiaries, and trust res to be clearly labeled, and the trustee 
must be appointed by express and unambiguous terms.155 
Some courts have rejected the DOL’s position and have held 
that the trust need not be a separate stand-alone document, but  
instead could be incorporated in the base plan document.156  In 
                                                
150 Id. at § 1024(b)(4). 
151 29 C.F.R. § 2550.403a-1(a) (2015) (emphasis added). 
152 See Brief Sec’y of Labor as amicus curiae in support of Appellant at 8-9,  
Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n of Prof’l Firefighters, 651 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-
15472, 11-16024, 11-16081, 11-16082). 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 8 (“[T]he statute clearly contemplates the formal execution of a trust 
instrument and the appointment of trustees, as the Secretary’s regulations reflect.”). 
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the case of Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n of Prof’l Firefighters,157 the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the DOL’s interpretation and allowed the 
plan document to be the written instrument establishing the 
trust relationship, thus naming the defendant as trustee.158   
Relying on trust law, the terms “trust” and “trustee,” which are 
not defined under ERISA, are defined by the legal relationship 
that exist either expressly or implicitly between a person or an 
entity who is “bound to deal with property over which he has 
control for the benefit of certain persons[,]” and the beneficiaries 
have the ability to enforce that obligation.159  The court  
expressly rejected the DOL’s argument that the “hold-in-trust” 
requirement mandates the creation of a document that has the 
“express words of trust.”160  Under the facts of the case, the plan 
document created the trust relationship and named the trustee, 
which was sufficient for purposes of ERISA Section 403 and its 
related regulations.161  The court concluded that it may be  
“better practice” to have used “express words of trust, and  
clearly label the trustees, beneficiaries, and the trust res,” but 
Congress did not mandate such a requirement.162 
C.    Investment Policy Statements as Plan Documents 
The next document that may establish or govern the plan 
document is the plan’s investment policy statement (IPS).  The 
purpose of an IPS is to aid the investment committee of a plan in 
supervising, monitoring, and evaluating the management of the 
plan, including its investments.163  This is certainly important 
                                                
157 782 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2015). 
158  Id. at 1078 (quoting Walter G. Hart, What is a Trust?, 15 L.Q. REV. 294, 301 
(1899)). 
159 Id. at 1079. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 1080. 
162 Id. at 1079. 
163 See 1 STUART D. ZIMRING ET AL., Fundamentals of Special Needs Trusts, § 
7.02[3][D] (Matthew Bender 2016); see, e.g., Hall v. Nat’l City Bank of Pa., 2010 WL 
1405443 at *2 (“The stated purpose of the IPS was ‘to assist the Adviser [Chiampou] 
and Client [plaintiff] in effectively supervising, monitoring and evaluating the  
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when a plan appoints outside investment managers to invest 
some or all of the plan assets.  The IPS generally provides  
criteria to select, monitor, evaluate, and compare the  
performance results of a plan’s investment options, using rate-of-
return and risk characteristics.164 
While it is considered “best practice” for a retirement plan 
to have an IPS,165 ERISA does not require that a plan adopt an 
IPS.166  If a plan adopts an IPS, the DOL applies a rigid view 
that the IPS then becomes part of the binding plan document 
that is subject to the fiduciary requirements of ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(D).167  Under a DOL Interpretative Bulletin, the  
organization defined a “‘statement of investment policy [as] a 
written statement that provides the fiduciaries who are  
responsible for plan investments with guidelines or general  
instructions concerning various types or categories of investment 
management decisions, which may include proxy voting  
decisions.”168  As a result, a statement of investment policy  
issued by a named fiduciary to appoint investment managers 
would be “part of the ‘documents and instruments governing the 
plan’ within the meaning of ERISA Sec[tion] 404(a)(1)(D).”169  
As noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit in its Faircloth decision 
held that the plan’s funding policy and investment policies were 
                                                                                                       
investment of the Client's assets.’”).  
164 See, e.g., Americans for the Arts v. Ruth Lily Charitable Remainder Annuity 
Trust #1, 855 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“National City had formulated a 
draft Investment Policy Statement for the CRATs, the purpose of which was ‘to  
identify and present the investment objectives, investment guidelines and  
performance measurement standards’ for the CRATs’ assets”). 
165 See JAMES E. ANDERSON, ROBERT G. BAGNALL & MARIANNE K. SMYTHE, 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS: LAW & COMPLIANCE § 15.09[3][a] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 
2016).  
166 See id.  
167 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2015) (“Statements of investment policy issued by a 
named fiduciary authorized to appoint investment managers would be part of the 
‘documents and instruments’ governing the plan”). See also Brief for Sec’y of Labor as 
amicus curiae in Support of Appellant at 26, Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n. of Prof’l.  
Firefighters, 651 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-15472, 11-16024, 11-16081, 11-
16082). 
168 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2015). 
169 Id. 
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subject to disclosure under ERISA Section 104(b)(4) because 
they set forth the employer’s obligations to fund the plan, which 
was an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), and explained 
the responsibilities regarding investment of assets of the 
ESOP.170  As such, they were “formal documents under which 
the ESOP [was] managed.”171 
While the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that an IPS was not 
an “instrument” for purposes of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) under 
the facts of that case, it did not rule out that investment  
guidelines could be such “instruments.”172  The Fifth Circuit 
agreed with the majority of the circuits in its construction of the 
catchall provision of ERISA Section 104(b)(4) with its narrow  
approach.  However, the appellants in the case did not  
specifically plead that the guidelines in question were binding on 
the plans at issue, nor attached to the complaint portions of the 
plan; they also did not question if the guidelines had a  
mandatory effect.173  The court emphasized that its holding was 
consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Faircloth  
regarding the investment policies in that case because “the plan  
contemplate[d] the establishment of funding and investment  
policies.”174  The Fifth Circuit also rejected the application of the 
DOL regulations stating that “‘[s]tatements of investment policy 
issued by a named fiduciary authorized to appoint investment 
managers would be part of the “documents and instruments  
governing the plan[,]”’” as those regulations were construing 
ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), and not ERISA Section 104(b)(4).175  
The Fifth Circuit concluded that disclosure under ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(D) is “broader” than ERISA Section 104(b)(4) as it 
“may not necessarily be limited to formal legal documents.”176 
                                                
170 Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 656. 
171 Id. 
172 See Murphy v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 13-11117, Appeal from U.S. Dis. Ct. for 
the N. Dis. Tex. (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014). 
173 Id. at 145. 
174 Id. (quoting Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
175 Murphy, No. 13-11117. 
176 Id. at 145-46 (referring to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 587 (10th ed. 2014)  
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Whether an IPS can be a “document” governing the plan for 
purposes of ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D) is an open issue, as the 
circuit courts are not uniform in their treatment of IPSs as plan  
documents for fiduciary purposes.177  The Second Circuit in the 
case of Dardaganis v. Grace Capital Inc.178 affirmed the district 
court’s finding of a breach of fiduciary duties to the Grace  
Capital, Inc. (GCI) fund because the registered investment  
advisor, president, chief executive officer, and principal  
shareholder of GCI deviated from the written agreement that 
governed GCI's actions as the investment manager of the fund’s 
assets.179  In the terms of the investment management  
agreement between the trustees and GCI, the latter “promised to 
manage the [Fund’s] Account in strict conformity with the  
investment guidelines promulgated by the Trustees from time to 
time and with all applicable Federal and State laws and  
regulations.”180  The district court held that ERISA Section 
404(a)(1)(D) required one to “abide by the plan documents  
together with the Agreement’s provision that GCI manage the 
account in strict conformity with the investment guidelines”  
and resulted in a holding that “[a]ny violation of the terms of 
[the] [a]greement constitutes a breach of . . . fiduciary duty[.]”181  
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the argument, at the  
summary judgment stage, that there was still a dispute as to 
whether GCI violated the guidelines set forth in the agreement, 
as it was apparent that GCI had not complied with the  
guidelines.182  The court also rejected the claim that a fiduciary’s 
failure to abide by the plan documents was not necessarily a 
breach of duty because that liability required the conduct not to 
                                                                                                       
(defining “document” as “[s]omething tangible on which words, symbols, or marks are  
recorded”)). 
177 See infra notes 178-207 and accompanying discussion.  
178 889 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1989). 
179 Id. at 1240. 
180 Id. at 1239 (with four sets of guidelines limiting GCI’s investment discretion).  
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 1240. 
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be prudent under the circumstances.183  
The Ninth Circuit in its Ca. Ironworkers Field Pension 
Trust v. Loomis Sayles & Co.184 case agreed with the Second  
Circuit’s Dardaganis decision in holding that a plan’s written 
statements of investment policy, to the extent the plan is  
consistent with the provisions of ERISA, could constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty.185  Under the facts of the case, the  
parties agreed that the trusts in question were ERISA employee 
benefit plans, and that Loomis’ management of the trust funds 
was governed both by ERISA and the trusts’ investment  
guidelines.186  However, upon review of the actions of Loomis as 
an investment manager, the court affirmed the lower court’s  
ruling that Loomis did not violate the actual terms of the written 
investment guidelines, and would not impose fiduciary liability 
even if Loomis had failed to comply with the “spirit” of those 
guidelines.187 
In the 2007 district court opinion Alco Industries, Inc. v. 
Wachovia Corp.,188 Alco sponsored two defined benefit pension 
plans and hired an investment manager, Wachovia, to manage 
some of the plans’ assets.189  Alco adopted a formal investment 
policy statement calling for a specific investment strategy.190  In 
a suit by Alco against another plan fiduciary for breach of  
fiduciary duty, the court simply stated that investment strategy 
statements are “plan documents” for investment managers to  
follow when exercising their discretion, citing ERISA Section 
                                                
183 Id. at 1241-42. 
184 259 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2001).  
185 Id. at 1042 (citing Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1241-42 
(2d Cir. 1989)). 
186 Id. at 1041 (such “guidelines required that [the] investment managers inform 
the Trustees of significant changes in investment strategy, adhere to the ‘prudence’ 
rule, maintain sufficient liquidity to meet current cash needs, and obey the  
instructions of the Trustees.”). 
187 Id. at 1043. 
188 527 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. Penn. 2007). 
189 Id. at 403. 
190 Id. at 404. 
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404(a)(1)(D).191 
In contrast, a Fifth Circuit decision in Kirschbaum v.  
Reliant Energy, Inc.192 appears to reject the premise that a  
statement of investment policy constitutes a plan document for 
ERISA fiduciary purposes.193  The facts in that case involved an 
ESOP plan where the funds were to be invested almost  
exclusively in Reliant Energy, Inc. (REI) common stock.194  REI, 
as the named fiduciary to the plan, directed the plan trustee 
through a statement of investment policy, detailing how the 
plan’s investments would be managed.195  The case involved a 
breach of fiduciary claim, as the participants’ individual  
accounts were invested almost entirely in employer common 
stock while the value of the stock continued to decline.196  In  
reference to details about a small, short-term cash component for 
the fund in the investment policy, the court remarked that the 
investment policy was “albeit not a constitutive Plan  
document[.]”197  Later, the Fifth Circuit had another occasion to 
discuss the status of IPSs in the context of both ERISA Sections 
104(b)(4) and 404(a)(1)(D).198  As discussed earlier, the court 
held IPSs were not “instruments” for purposes of disclosure  
under ERISA Section 104(b)(4), but it failed to resolve whether 
they were “instruments” under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), as 
the issue was moot under the facts of that case.199 
More recently, the Eighth Circuit in Tussey v. ABB, Inc.200 
reserved judgment as to whether an IPS is a binding plan  
                                                
191 Id. 
192 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008). 
193 Id. at 252. 
194 Id. at 250. 
195 Id. at 251-52 (the investment policy outlined the investment objectives of the 
plan, the funding requirements, the target allocation of long-term assets, monitoring, 
and performance guidelines). 
196 Id. at 247. 
197 Id. at 250. 
198 Murphy v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 13-11117, Appeal from U.S. Dis. Ct. for the 
N. Dis. Tex. at 2 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014). 
199 Id. at 11. 
200 746 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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document for purposes of ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D).201  The 
lower court held that ABB breached its fiduciary duty to the 
plan by failing to monitor recordkeeping costs of the plan’s  
assets and for failing to comply with the plan’s IPS, which stated 
“at all times, [Alliance] rebates will be used to offset or reduce 
the cost of providing administrative services to plan  
participants.”202  The employer, AAB, had created an IPS for 
purposes of selecting, deselecting, and monitoring investments 
offered under the plan, which required a specific process to  
follow when deselecting a fund.203  The district court held that 
the IPS was a governing plan document for purposes of ERISA 
Section 404(a)(1)(D), citing the DOL’s Interpretive Bulletin  
Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy.204   
Because “the IPS specifically require[d] that revenue sharing  be 
used to offset or reduce the cost of providing administrative  
services to [p]lan participants[,]” ABB failed to comply and 
thereby did not act prudently in discharging its duties.205  In  
vacating the district court’s ruling, the Eighth Circuit cautioned 
that it did not wish to construe all IPSs as binding plan  
documents so as to discourage their use, but questioned whether 
the IPS at issue—“informally implemented to provide a  
framework for administering the Plan itself”—would be a  
binding plan document.206  As the district court previously found 
breaches of the duties of loyalty and prudence independent of 
the IPS, the Eighth Circuit did not have to answer this  
question.207 
Given the uncertainty under existing case law, the best  
approach from the plan sponsor’s and fiduciary’s perspective is 
to frame the IPS as a document that provides flexible guidance 
                                                
201 Id. at 344 n. 5. 
202 Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 52 EB Cases 2826 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012). 
203 Id. 
204 Id.  
205 Id. 
206 See Tussey, 746 F.3d at 334 n.5. 
207 Id. 
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and that permits the fiduciaries to exercise their independent  
discretion and judgment based on the totality of the  
circumstances.  An IPS that contains numerous specificities and 
requires rigid adherence to those specificities subjects the plan 
fiduciaries to potential liability to the terms of the plan  
document and related instruments. 
D.    Summary Plan Descriptions as Plan Documents 
The last document that may constitute a plan document is 
the Summary Plan Description (SPD).  The Supreme Court in 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara208 confronted this issue in the context of 
a conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash 
balance plan with conflicting and misleading terms set forth in 
the plan’s SPD.209  CIGNA had created a separate plan  
document, as a prior plan had been terminated and a new plan 
created, as well as a separate SPD, each functioning on its 
own.210  The district court held the SPDs and summary  
of material modifications (SMM) to have violated ERISA  
Sections 102(a), 104(b), and 204(h), and thus, used the  
misrepresentations to reform the terms of the new plan so as to 
authorize reformed benefits under ERISA Section 
502(a)(1)(B).211  
In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General argued that the 
plan terms as written included the SPD’s terms, and thus the 
terms of these summaries were the terms of the plan.212  The 
Supreme Court rejected this approach in interpreting ERISA 
Section 502(a)(1)(B), as they were “‘enforc[ing]’ the ‘terms of the 
                                                
208 563 U.S. 421 (2011). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 421. 
211 See Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.Conn. 2008), aff’d 348 
Fed. Appx. 627 (2d Cir. 2009) (unpub. opin.), vacated 563 U.S. 421 (2011). 
212 See Brief for the Sec’y of Lab. as Amicus Curiae Supporting  
Respondent-Appellee, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011),  
available at https://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/amara%28A%29-9-22-2011.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JL4K-WHXC]. 
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plan,’” not changing them as the district court had.213  The Court 
stated that it “cannot agree that the terms of statutorily  
required plan summaries (or summaries of plan modifications) 
necessarily may be enforced (under § 502(a)(1)(B)) as the terms 
of the plan itself[,]” even if the lower court had viewed the  
summaries as plan terms, which the Court said it did not.214  
In reaching its decision, the Court relied on three  
principles.215  First, ERISA Section 102 requires plan  
administrators to furnish SPDs, which “suggest that the  
information about the plan provided by [the SPD] is not itself 
part of the plan.”216  Second, if the SPD was regarded as part of 
the plan, it would then grant authority to the plan administrator 
to establish plan terms, which is a function that should be  
limited to the plan sponsor and is similar to a trust’s settlor.217  
The Court went on to say that ERISA distinguishes the roles of 
plan sponsor and plan administrator, and does not intend to  
provide the administrator with the power to alter the plan terms 
“indirectly” by including them in the SPD.218  Finally, the court 
held that SPDs are intended to be a “clear, simple  
communication.”219  Making them part of the plan document 
“could well lead plan administrators to sacrifice simplicity and 
comprehensibility in order to describe plan terms in the  
language of lawyers.”220  Such result would lead to complexity 
and defeat the “fundamental purpose of the summaries.”221  
The Court concluded by saying that the SPDs were “the 
summary documents . . . [that] provide communication with  
beneficiaries about the plan, but that their statements do not 
                                                
213 See CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 436-37. 
214 Id. at 436. 
215 Id.  
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 437 (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 
514 U.S. 73, 81-85 (1995)). 
219 Id.  
220 Id. at 437. 
221 Id.  
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themselves constitute the terms of the plan[.]”222  Under the facts 
of the case, there were two documents—a separate retirement 
plan document and a separate summary plan description.223  
Amara resolved the issue of whether the terms of the SPD 
could no longer trump the conflicting terms of the plan  
document, but left open the question of whether the terms of the 
SPD can ever constitute the terms of the plan.224   
Post-Amara, several circuit and district courts have wrestled 
with the issue as to whether the terms of the SPD are  
enforceable.225  In cases where the governing plan documents 
explicitly incorporate the SPD or other plan-related documents 
into the plan, the SPD has been held to be enforceable.226   
The First Circuit in Tetreault v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co.,227 addressed the issue of the long-term disability plan, as 
the case expressly incorporated the terms of the SPD by  
reference, thereby including the SPD’s appeals deadline.228  
Thus, the “beneficiary’s failure to meet that deadline” could 
serve to bar her from challenging an adverse benefit decision.229  
The court did not find the Amara case applicable because Amara 
was silent on the issue of whether the terms of the SPD are  
enforceable under a fact pattern like this case.230  While the SPD 
as a stand-alone document could not create rights and duties 
under the plan, the court held that “Amara pose[d] no automatic 
bar to a” plan incorporating the terms contained in the SPD.231  
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in the case of 
                                                
222 Id. at 438. 
223 See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 534 F. Supp. 2d 288, 310 (D. Conn. 2008). 
224 See CIGNA Corp., 563 U.S. at 421.  
225 See infra notes 227-267 and accompanying discussion.  
226 See infra notes 227-234 and accompanying discussion.    
227 769 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2014). 
228 Id. at 54. 
229 Id. at 57. 
230 Id. at 56. 
231 Id. (citing Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 
1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011)); Langlois v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 
1185-86 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Henderson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 2:11-
CV-187, 2012 WL 2419961, at *5 (D. Utah June 26, 2012). 
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Johnson v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,232 where the  
insurance policy incorporated the SPD and the Certificate of  
Insurance as part of the policy.233  As the SPD contained the 
necessary language to confer discretionary authority to the plan 
administrator, discretion was thereby granted.234  
Other cases go beyond this to enforce the terms of the SPD 
as long as they do not conflict with the plan.235  In a case  
regarding whether the plan had ambiguous language that  
affected the plan administrator’s discretionary authority, the 
Eighth Circuit reviewed the language of the SPD to clarify the 
plan’s language.236  As authority, the court cited the DOL  
regulations that required SPDs to describe “all claims  
procedures.”237  In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the SPD can be a document or instrument governing 
the plan and that the statements are binding, even though its  
language did not constitute the terms of the plan.238   
If there is no plan document and the SPD is the sole  
document, or if the plan serves as both the plan document and 
                                                
232 775 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2014).  
233 Id. at 988. 
234 Id.  But compare Bowers v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 21 F. Supp. 3d 
993, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 2014) (where the SPD stated it was not a part of the  
insurance contract and would not “waive or alter” the terms of the policy, its  
discretion-granting language could not be used where the unambiguous plan did not 
have such discretionary language) and Brown v. Life Insurance Co. of North  
America, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1125, (D. Nev. 2014) (holding that the SPD’s discretionary 
language did not apply where it was not part of the insurance contract and where it 
stated that it did not “alter or waive” the terms of the policy). 
235 See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying discussion.  
236 See Prezioso v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 748 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir. 
2014). 
237 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R § 2560.503-1(b)(2), cross-referencing § 2520.102-3). 
238 Liss v. Fidelity Emp’r Servs. Co., 516 Fed. Appx. 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2013).  
E.g., L & W Associates. Welfare Ben. Plan v. Estate of Terance R. Wines, (E.D. Mich. 
Jan. 13, 2014) (holding that the SPD is the plan document where no formal plan  
document exists) and Board of Trustees v. Moore, 800 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the SPD is a binding plan document that sets forth the enforceable 
subrogation terms).  But see Oldoerp v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability 
Plan, 500 Fed. Appx. 575, 576-77 (9th Cir. 2012) (refusing to enforce the grant of  
discretionary authority to the plan administrator in the SPD because the plan, which 
consisted of the group policy, the Certificate of Insurance, and amendments to the 
policy, did not confer such discretion). 
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the SPD, the courts thus far have enforced the terms of the 
SPD.239  In the Tenth Circuit’s case of Eugene v. Horizon Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey,240 the plaintiff appealed the 
lower court’s use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of  
review in a benefits denial claim.241  The plaintiff argued that 
under Amara, the SPD was simply a summary of the plan and 
could not itself be part of the plan.242  The plaintiff made two  
arguments: (1) the record did not include documents governing 
the plan, and thus could not verify that the grant of discretion 
with the SPD was valid; and (2) the grant of discretionary  
authority solely from the SPD was insufficient.243  The Tenth 
Circuit read Amara to apply in two different contexts: (1) the 
terms of the SPD are unenforceable as they conflict with the 
plan document, or (2) the SPD creates terms that are not  
authorized or reflected in the governing plan documents.244   
Neither of those situations existed in Eugene because the SPD 
was part of the plan.245  The SPD stated in its introduction “that 
it “along with the individual ‘Certificate of Coverage . . . form[s] 
[the] Group Insurance Certificate;’ that it ‘is made part of the 
Group Policy;’ and that ‘[a]ll benefits are subject in every way to 
the entire Group Policy, which includes’ the SPD.”246  Because 
the SPD unequivocally stated that it was part of the plan, the 
court could review its language to see if it granted discretion to 
the plan administrator in reviewing benefit claims.247  Finding 
that it did, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.248  
 
                                                
239 See infra notes 240-267 and accompanying discussion.  
240 663 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2011). 
241 Id.  
242 Id. at 1131. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Eugene, 663 F.3d at 1132. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 1133. 
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Other district and circuit courts have affirmed this result.249  
The Sixth Circuit in Board of Trustees of the National Elevator 
Industry Health Benefit Plan v. Moore250 upheld the SPD’s  
subrogation provision when the SPD was held to be the binding 
plan document.251  The case involved a trust agreement that  
authorized the trustees to adopt a written welfare benefits 
plan.252  Instead of drafting a separate plan document, the  
trustees approved an SPD, which functioned as both the ERISA 
plan and the SPD under the terms provided.253  The court noted 
two unreported cases in the Third and Eleventh Circuits that 
were called to review the same SPD at issue in this case and  
recognized that the SPD functioned as the plan in lieu of a  
separate plan document.254 
A district court ruling in Langlois v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co.255 affirmed the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review in a benefits denial claim, even though it was found in 
the SPD.256  While the plaintiff argued that language in the SPD 
was insufficient to grant a finding of discretionary authority  
because it was not the plan, the court declined to read Amara as 
precluding any reliance on the SPD in determining deference.257  
Instead, the court interpreted Amara to permit the enforcement 
of the terms of the SPD, provided they did not conflict with the 
terms of the plan.258  As the defendant’s counsel stated, there 
could be other documents “associated with the Plan,” and the  
                                                
249 See infra notes 250-267 and accompanying discussion.  
250 800 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 2015) 
251 Id. at 219. 
252 Id.  
253 Id. at 220. 
254 Id. (citing Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan v. 
Montanile, 593 Fed. Appx. 154 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1405 (2015) and 
Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Inds. Health Ben. Plan v. Montanile, 593 Fed. 
Appx. 903, 910 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 1700 (2015)). 
255 833 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
256 Id. at 1186. 
257 Id. at 1185. 
258 Id. at 1185-86. 
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defendant accordingly treated the SPD as the plan.259  Thus, the 
court affirmed the grant of discretionary authority to the plan 
administrator due to the terms of the SPD.260   
The district court in the case of L&W Associates Welfare 
Benefit Plan v. Estate of Terance R. Wines261 reached a similar 
conclusion, stating that “Amara does not support the broad 
proposition  . . . that [a summary-document] can never serve as 
an ERISA plan document.”262  The district court in Jenkins v. 
Grant Thornton LLP,263 also affirmed that a Booklet-Certificate 
was a plan document because there was no separate long-term 
disability plan.264  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Silva v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.265 held that under the facts of its case 
the plan could not function as both the plan and the SPD  
because the length and complexity of the language of the plan 
could not be understood by “the average plan participant.”266  As 
such, it did not constitute “clear” and “simple” communication as 
required under the statute for an SPD.267 
Summary Plan Descriptions remain important documents 
for other reasons. The Eighth Circuit in the case of Silva v.  
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.268 held that there could be a breach of  
fiduciary duty claim if the plan administrator failed to distribute 
the correct SPD by withholding information regarding  
                                                
259 Id. at 1186. 
260 Id. at 1185-86. 
261 No. 12-CV-13524 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014). 
262 Id. at *6. 
263 No. 0:13-CV-60957 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2015). 
264 Id.  (citing to an Eleventh Circuit unpublished opinion, Bd. of Trustees of 
Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan v. Montanile, 593 Fed. Appx. 903, 910 (11th 
Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 644 Fed. Appx. 984 (11th Cir. 2016), which stated 
“‘Amara only precludes courts from enforcing summary plan descriptions, pursuant 
to § 1132(a)(1), where the terms of that summary conflict with the terms specified in 
other, governing documents.  However, the Amara Court had no occasion to consider 
whether the terms of a summary plan description are enforceable where it is the only 
document . . . .’”). 
265 762 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2014). 
266 Id. at 721. 
267 Id. 
268 762 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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enrollment in the plan.269  In summary, the documents that  
govern a plan may be numerous and the terms of each  
instrument are important in determining how the plan is to be 
administered, and should themselves contain protective  
provisions as applicable. The case law also highlights the  
importance of consistency between the terms of the plan and the 
terms of the SPD.270  
For a self-insured welfare plan, the plan sponsor could  
consider a combination SPD plan document, but he or she should 
state that the SPD serves as the official plan document.  If the 
welfare plan “wraps” around a vendor’s booklet, for example, by 
incorporating all of a group insurance policies’ booklets that  
provide welfare benefits to employees, the wrap plan document 
should set forth those administrative provisions that rarely 
change.  Additionally, the plan sponsor should incorporate by 
reference an SPD that is updated on a regular basis and the 
summary material modifications that have been provided since 
the last distributed SPD.  Plan sponsors will need to engage the 
vendor in any changes made to the plan document that deviate 
from a vendor’s booklet. 
IV.  PROTECTIVE PLAN PROVISIONS TO CONSIDER FOR 
INSERTION 
While ERISA Section 402 mandates that certain provisions 
must be included in a plan document, there are a number of  
optional provisions that can be inserted in the plan document 
that are enforced by the courts.271  The provisions discussed in 
this Part include grants of discretionary powers to review benefit 
claims, interpret the terms of the plan, and make factual  
findings; subrogation and reimbursement provisions; standing 
                                                
269 Id.  See also Thomas v. CIGNA Group Ins., No. 1:09-CV-05029 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015) (stating that posting the SPD on a company’s website without prior notice is 
not an acceptable method of distribution under the DOL’s regulations as it is similar 
to placing materials in an area frequented by participants).  
270 See supra notes 236-267 and accompanying discussion.  
271 29 U.S.C. § 1102.  
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for out-of-network providers; statute of limitations for benefit 
claims or non-fiduciary claims brought under ERISA Section 
502(a)(3); arbitration clauses and class waivers; venue locations 
for a cause of action under Title I of ERISA; and the settlor 
rights to amend, terminate, or modify the terms of the plan.272  
As the courts have allowed plan sponsors to craft these  
provisions in favor of the plan sponsor to reduce the costs of  
litigation,273 plan sponsors should consider modifying the terms 
of the plan to take advantage of this.  As demonstrated by the 
case law, the plan sponsor is advised to craft SPD terms that are 
consistent with the plan. 
A.    Judicial Standard of Review 
Courts must tackle the applicable judicial standard of  
review for a plan administrator’s denial of benefits.274  The  
Supreme Court resolved the issue back in 1989 with the  
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch275 decision.  Under the 
facts of that case, the employer established a self-funded and 
self-administered severance plan for its employee and  
conditioned eligibility for benefits upon a reduction in work force 
or corporate change of control.276  Upon spinning off one of its  
divisions, Firestone determined there was no “reduction in work 
force,” and therefore, the affected participants were not entitled 
to severance benefits.277  While the district court granted  
Firestone’s motion for summary judgment because the denial of 
                                                
272 See discussion infra Sections IV.A.-G.  
273 See Nancy G. Ross & Samuel P. Myler, Five Provisions to Reduce ERISA  
Litigation Risk: Plan Sponsors Can Significantly Limit Threats, Cost of Claims by 
Ensuring Plans Include These, THOMPSON’S HR COMPLIANCE EXPERT (May 2014), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/ef176777-7b56-4761-8b79-d54c1872df5a 
/Presentation/NewsAttachment/8c916fbb-77b5-4d65-a964-ad1102d8d246/Mayer 
Brown_PDF_0515.pdf [https://perma.cc/54JW-GNPK].  
274 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 105-06 (noting that Firestone established and maintained three  
pension and welfare benefit plans for its employees and was the sole source for  
funding those plans).  
277 Id. at 106. 
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benefits was not arbitrary or capricious, the Third Circuit  
reversed because the employer, as plan administrator, was  
a conflict of interest.278  Relying on trust law, the Supreme Court 
reversed and permitted plans to grant discretionary authority to 
the plan administrator, entitling the plan administrator “to  
deference in exercising that discretion,” such as the abuse of  
discretion standard.279  In the absence of a grant of discretionary 
authority, the standard of review would be de novo.280 
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the plan  
administrator’s “interpretation will not be disturbed if  
reasonable.”281  Its interpretation is not made “invalid merely 
because [a court] disagree[s] with it, but only if it is  
unreasonable.”282  In its latest decision on the topic, the Supreme 
Court noted that the judicial standard of review was fashioned 
to preserve a “‘“careful balancing” between ensuring fair and 
prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the  
encouragement of the creation of such plans.’”283  As a result,  
allowing the employer to grant interpretative authority over the 
plan to the plan administrator  
(1) encourages employers to offer ERISA plans by 
controlling administrative costs and litigation  
expenses; (2) creates administrative efficiency; (3) 
“promotes predictability, as an employer can rely 
on the expertise of the plan administrator rather 
than worry about unexpected and inaccurate plan 
interpretations that might result from de novo  
judicial review”; and (4) “serves the interest of  
uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork of  
                                                
278 See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(believing that the de novo standard was more appropriate when the administrator 
was conflicted). 
279 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111. 
280 Id. at 112. 
281 Id.  
282 See Hutchins v. Champion Int’l Corp., 110 F.3d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir.  1997). 
283 See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010). 
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different interpretations of a plan.”284 
The issue has also arisen as to whether the Firestone  
deference goes beyond plan interpretation and applies to  
findings of fact made by the plan administrator.   Although the 
Fifth Circuit has held that a plan administrator’s fact finding 
decisions should always be reviewed under the abuse of  
discretion standard, other circuits have held to the contrary in 
the absence of plan language.285 
Due to the highly deferential standard of review,286  
employers of non-insured employee benefit plans should confer 
discretionary powers to the plan administrator to provide  
deference to the plan administrator’s factual findings.   
Accordingly, this standard is “highly prized by benefit plans” and 
their administrators.287 
Plan sponsors should consider conferring similar  
discretionary authority on plan trustees in exercising their  
powers.  Most circuits that have addressed the issue apply the 
deferential standard to trustees’ decisions where there has been 
a grant of discretionary authority.288  The Eighth Circuit more 
                                                
284 Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 334-35 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004)). 
285 Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the administrator’s decisions as to findings of fact should always be  
reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388, 
395 (5th Cir. 1998).  But compare Torres v. Pittston Co., 346 F.1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 
2003) (declining to follow the Fifth Circuit’s approach); Riedl v. General Am. Life Ins. 
Co., 248 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that absent language in the plan 
granting discretionary authority to the plan administrator to determine eligibility for 
benefits or to construe terms of the plan, findings of fact determinations should  
receive de novo review); Walker v. American Home Shield Long Term Disability 
Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 1999); Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life 
Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249-51 (2d Cir. 1999); Rowan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
119 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1997). 
286 See supra notes 274-285 and accompanying discussion.  
287 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 (2002).  
288 Armstrong v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 446 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the standard of judicial review of discretionary judgments is abuse of 
discretion); Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that there is “no barrier” in using the deferential standard to a case “not involving a 
typical review of denial of benefits); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 
1995) (following trust law for claims under “29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) based on  
violations of fiduciary duties set forth in section 1104(a)”); Tussey,746 F.3d at 335.  
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recently found no compelling reason to limit the Firestone  
deference to benefit claims.289  Similarly, the plan and trust  
documents should explicitly confer discretionary authority to the 
trustees in selecting plan asset investments and plan providers, 
including their related compensation.  
B.    Subrogation and Reimbursement Provisions 
Healthcare plans usually contain subrogation and  
reimbursement clauses granting the plan the contractual right 
to recoup monies paid from the plan.290  The most common  
example occurs when a healthcare plan pays for a participant’s 
or beneficiary’s medical expenses incurred during an accident, 
and then the participant or beneficiary sues the third party  
tortfeasor to recover health care and other expenses incurred in 
connection with the accident.291  ERISA neither prohibits nor  
authorizes subrogation on the part of a healthcare plan,292 but 
the Supreme Court has upheld a plan’s subrogation rights as  
determined under the “catch-all” cause of action of ERISA  
Section 502(a)(3).293  
                                                                                                       
But compare John Blair Commc’ns, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Grp., Inc. 
Profit Sharing Plan, 26 F.3d 360, 369 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to use the deferential 
standard beyond the “simple denial of benefits”); Bidwell v. Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc., 685 
F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring no deference for claims for breaches of fidu-
ciary duty); Futral v. Chastant, No. 13-30856 at 3, n.1 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying the 
de novo standard of review to a breach of fiduciary duty claim). 
289 Tussey, 746 F.3d at 335 (stating “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the 
trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by 
the court except to prevent an abuse by the trustees of his discretion”). 
290 Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of 
the ERISA Settlor/fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 459, 505 (2015) (“Health 
care plans typically include provisions permitting the plan to recover the cost of 
health care benefits provided to a participant who is injured in an accident and  
subsequently receives an award or settlement from the tortfeasor that caused the 
accident or the tortfeasor's insurance company.”).  
291 Id.  
292 Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 361 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that health care plan reimbursement and subrogation provisions were  
enforceable under state law and not barred by ERISA).  
293 See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210-14 
(2001) (denying equitable relief as the funds were not in Knudson’s possession but in 
a trust required by state law); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, LLC, 547 
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A subrogation clause allows the plan to “stand in the shoes 
of” the participant or beneficiary to pursue a right to recover 
from the tortfeasor to the extent of the plan’s payments.294  In 
contrast, a reimbursement clause, standing alone, offers no such 
contractual right for the plan to pursue the tortfeasor directly, 
but instead allows the plan to recover its expenses from the plan 
participant or beneficiary.295  Having both provisions in the 
healthcare plan permits the plan to choose how it wishes to  
proceed.296  However, the plan must first pay healthcare benefits 
to the participant or beneficiary in order to trigger either  
subrogation or reimbursement.297  A plan’s or insurer’s ability to 
enforce reimbursement or subrogation rights may depend on 
whether the action is governed by federal or state laws.   Health 
plans that are fully insured are subject to both federal and state 
laws, and some states prohibit the insurer’s right to subrogate or 
reimburse.298  ERISA generally preempts state law that would 
                                                                                                       
U.S. 356, 362-63 (2006) (providing equitable relief as the identifiable funds were in 
Sereboff’s possession and control); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S.Ct. 1537, 
1546 (2013) (denying an equitable lien over funds due to the plan’s reimbursement 
provisions); Montanile v. Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit 
Plan, 136 S.Ct. 651, 657-58 (2016) (denying an equitable lien over the funds as the 
defendant dissipated the settlement funds). 
294 Roger M. Baron & Anthony P. Lamb, The Revictimization of Personal Injury 
Victims by ERISA Subrogation Claims, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 329 (2012).  
295 New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“Even if a provision mentions both subrogation and reimbursement, if that provision 
gives the insurer the right to assert the actions and rights of the insured against the 
tortfeasor, then the clause is a subrogation clause. A true reimbursement clause does 
not allow the insurer to proceed against the tortfeasor.”) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Brister v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 So.2d 1040, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 
1990) (differentiating between a subrogation clause and a reimbursement clause).  
296 See McIntosh v. Pacific Holding Co., 992 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1993)  
(nothing that a reimbursement clause “creates a contractual obligation for  
reimbursement” and that a subrogation clause “deals with a statutory or  
common-law right to subrogation.”).  
297 See Helfrich v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 804 F.3d 1090, 1106 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (“the subrogation and reimbursement requirements in the Plan are tied 
directly to payments with respect to benefits. They are triggered when a third party 
injures an enrollee and the Plan pa[ys] benefits for that injury.”) (internal quotations 
omitted) (internal citations omitted).  
298 See Med. Mut. Of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 564 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding a 
California law prohibiting reimbursement of medical expenses was applicable to an 
ERISA insurer); Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 280 (4th 
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prohibit a self-insured plan’s ability to pursue its subrogation 
rights against the tortfeasor,299 but the courts are split as to 
whether ERISA preempts state law claims by the plan against 
the participant or beneficiary for reimbursement or  
subrogation.300 
The DOL regulations require that the SPD set forth the 
“circumstances which may result in . . . forfeiture, suspension, 
offset, reduction, or recovery (e.g., by exercise of subrogation or 
reimbursement rights) of any benefits that a participant or  
beneficiary might otherwise reasonably expect the plan to  
provide on the basis of the description of benefits . . . [.]”301  
Hence, the plan’s subrogation and reimbursement clauses should 
be described in the SPD.  The district court’s decision in U.S.  
Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen302 is illustrative of the problems that 
can develop if the plan and the SPD are not consistent.303  Upon 
remand from the Supreme Court’s decision,304 the district court 
was confronted with inconsistent terms between the plan and 
the SPD.305  The plan stated that if benefits were paid from the 
                                                                                                       
Cir. 2003) (finding a Maryland law prohibiting subrogation was applicable to an 
ERISA HMO insurer); Smith v. Life. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1290 
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (finding a Georgia anti-subrogation law was applicable to an insured 
ERISA plan).  
299 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers & Emp'rs Ariz. Health &  
Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a state anti-
subrogation law did not apply to a self-funded plan even though it had catastrophic 
insurance).  But compare Horrell v. CEC Entm’t Inc., No. 1:09-CV-951 at 6 (W.D. 
Mich. Oct. 18, 2011) (holding that Michigan’s no-fault law which would have limited 
the right of the health plan to pursue a no-fault car insurer was saved under ERISA’s 
preemption savings clause). 
300 See Providence Health Plan v. Skyles, No. 03:11-CV-06273-HU (D. Or. Apr. 9, 
2012) (finding no preemption); Bachman v. Genesis Invs., Inc. Health & Benefit 
Plan, No. 09-1212-HU, (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2011) (finding no preemption).  But compare 
Trustees of Drury Indus., Inc. Health Care Plan & Trust v. Goding, 692 F.3d 888, 
897 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1644 (2013) (finding preemption of a state 
claim against the participant’s attorney for conversion of settlement funds). 
301 29 C.F.R § 2520.102-3(l) (2015). 
302 No. 2:08-CV-1593 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 16, 2016). 
303 Id. at 11. 
304 See U.S. Airways, 133 S.Ct. at 1551 (rejecting the defenses of unjust  
enrichment, the common fund doctrine or the make-whole doctrine as they cannot 
overrule the terms of the plan). 
305 See U.S. Airways, No. 2:08-CV-1593 at 2. 
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plan as a result of an action of a third party, the plan would “be 
subrogated to all rights of recovery of any [p]articipant under 
this [p]lan in respect to such action.”306  The SPD stated  
[i]f the [p]lan pays benefits for any claim you incur 
as the result of negligence, willful misconduct, or 
other actions of a third party, the [p]lan will be 
subrogated to all your rights of recovery. You will 
be required to reimburse the [p]lan for amounts 
paid for claims out of any monies recovered from a 
third party, including, but not limited to, your own 
insurance company as the result of judgment,  
settlement, or otherwise.307  
Under the facts, McCutchen sustained injuries in an  
automobile accident.308  The plan paid for the accident-related 
medical expenses, but McCutchen recouped amounts from the 
driver and from his auto insurance policy.309  Pursuant to the 
terms of the SPD, the plan sought reimbursement of all monies 
recovered, including from McCutchen’s insurance company, but 
did not seek reimbursement under the plan document, as it  
contained no similar reimbursement language.310  The court  
declined to use the terms of the SPD and instead relied on the 
terms of the plan to hold that the plan could not seek  
reimbursement.311  Thus, this case is illustrative of the lesson 
that the terms of the SPD should be the same as the terms of the 
plan. 
The subrogation and reimbursement clauses generally set 
forth the kind of benefit payments that are subject to  
recoupment, the type of legal interest created, and the type of 
funds that are subject to reimbursement.312  This is attributed to 
                                                
306 See id. at 4. 
307 Id. at 3. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 5. 
311 U.S. Airways, No. 2:08-CV-1593 at 9. 
312 See, e.g., Popowski v. Parrott, 461 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the issue.313 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in the  
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson.314  While the 
Court did not reject the plan’s recoupment provision, it denied 
the plan’s claim to impose personal liability on the defendants 
for the payment of medical benefits, which was a claim for legal  
restitution, instead of pursuing a constructive trust or equitable 
lien.315  The Court emphasized that the funds to which the plan 
claimed entitlement were no longer in Knudson’s possession, but 
instead had been placed in a special needs trust under California 
law.316  
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a recent 
case, Montanile v. Bd. of Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. 
Health Benefit Plan,317 where the plan sought to enforce its  
reimbursement clause against a plan participant who recouped 
his medical claims both in an outside settlement and through his 
insurance.318  The Court declined to enforce the plan’s equitable 
lien by agreement, as Monantile had dissipated the funds,  
leaving the plan to recover out of his general assets, which is a 
legal remedy and not an equitable remedy.319  The Court held 
that to pursue a claim under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), two  
elements must be present: (1) the claim alleged must be  
equitable in nature, and (2) the remedy sought must be  
equitable.320  While the plan alleged to enforce its equitable lien 
by agreement through the terms of the plan against Montanile, 
the lien could not attach to separate and identifiable funds, as 
the plan administrator dissipated the funds in a way that could 
not be traced.321  While the plan trustees could have enforced its 
                                                
313 See infra notes 314-332 and accompanying discussion.  
314 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
315 See id. at 213. 
316 Id. at 214. 
317 136 S.Ct. 651, 655 (2016). 
318 Id. at 655-56. 
319 Id. at 659. 
320 Id. at 657-58. 
321 Id. at 659. 
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equitable lien against the settlement funds once they were in the 
participant’s possession, they did not at the time, and thus could 
not later pursue a claim to recover out of the participant’s  
general assets.322  The Court acknowledged that more than a 
decade had passed since the Great-West decision, affording time 
for plans to draft sufficient safeguards to protect their  
reimbursement rights and to enforce such rights on a timely  
basis.323 
In the case of Sereboff v. MidAtlantic Medical Services,324 
the plan sued the Sereboffs for recoupment of medical expenses 
recovered from a third party in a tort action, pursuant to the 
plan’s reimbursement clause.325  The Court allowed relief under 
ERISA Section 502(a)(3) and enforced the terms of the plan, as 
the plan sought “specifically identifiable” funds that the  
Sereboffs possessed and controlled from the tort settlement.326  
While the plan alleged a breach of contract and requested  
money, it pursued recovery through a constructive trust or  
equitable lien on specifically identifiable funds, not from the 
Sereboff’s assets generally.327 
While the circuits had been split on the issue of whether 
common law equitable defenses asserted by the defendant, such 
as the common fund doctrine or make-whole doctrine, could  
prevail in light of plan language that renounces those defenses, 
the Supreme Court in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen328 settled 
                                                
322 Id. at 659-660. 
323 Montanile, 136 S.Ct at 662 (the plan provisions required participants and 
beneficiaries to notify the plan if they began legal process against third parties and 
gave the plan the right of subrogation without reduction for attorneys’ fees, costs, 
expenses or damages, but here the plan waited half a year to object to the  
disbursement of funds by Montanile’s lawyer to Montanile). 
324 547 U.S. 356 (2006).  
325 Id. at 359 (the plan’s reimbursement provision “‘applies when [a beneficiary 
is] sick or injured as a result of the act or omission of another person or party,’ and 
requires such person who ‘receive[d] benefits’ under the plan for such injuries to  
‘reimburse [Mid Atlantic]’ for those benefits from ‘[a]ll recoveries from a third party 
(whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise).’”). 
326 Id. at 362-63. 
327 Id. at 363. 
328 133 S.Ct. 1537 (2013). 
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the issue and allowed the plan language to prevail.329  Under 
that decision, the terms of the SPD stated that if the plan paid 
for benefits for any claim incurred as a result of the negligence, 
willful misconduct, or other acts of a third party, the participant 
or beneficiary would be required to reimburse the plan from such 
recovery from the third party or any “‘insurance company as [a] 
result of a judgment, settlement or otherwise.’”330  As such, the 
agreement did not permit an attorney’s fees exception, such as 
allowing the common-fund rule, and the court held that the  
provisions of the agreement controlled and the plan was entitled 
to “first claim on the entire recovery.”331  As the action was 
brought under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) “based on an equitable 
lien by agreement,” the terms of the plan prevailed and neither  
principles of unjust enrichment or specific defenses, “such as 
double-recovery or common-fund rules,” defeated the terms of 
the plan.332 
These cases highlight that plan sponsors should have  
explicit subrogation and reimbursement rights and that a plan 
should clearly refute any common law equitable defenses that a 
court could consider in light of ambiguous disclaimer  
language.333  Plan sponsors should also require that plan  
participants and beneficiaries acknowledge the plan’s rights 
through a reimbursement agreement and require notification to 
the plan if any legal action has commenced.  Working with  
subrogation vendors, plan sponsors should make sure that  
potential claims are being tracked so they can act quickly before 
the participant or beneficiary dissipates the settlement funds. 
C.    Anti-Assignment Clause 
The ERISA causes of action specifically identify the parties 
                                                
329 Id. at 1543. 
330 Id.  
331 Id. at 1549. 
332 Id. at 1541. 
333 Id. at 1546-47. 
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that have standing to bring such cause under Title I—namely, 
the plan participants, beneficiaries, plan fiduciaries, and the 
Secretary of Labor.334  
There is an emerging growth in litigation where out-of-
network (OON) providers have alleged that self-funded 
healthcare plans have systemically underpaid OON providers 
through the use of networks, as OON providers are typically 
paid at a lower rate than in-network providers, or not paid at all 
because the services provided were not covered.335  In order to 
allege standing in a cause of action for benefits, on behalf of the 
participant or beneficiary, or for a breach of fiduciary cause, the 
OON provider must have the participant or beneficiary assign 
their rights under the plan such that the provider can “stand in 
their shoes” and have standing in the cause of action.336  As 
ERISA does not include medical providers on the list of  
individuals who may bring an ERISA claim,337 the OON provider 
must argue that the assignment of benefits signed by the  
                                                
334 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)-(6). 
335 See Patient Care Assocs., L.L.C. v. N.J. Carpenters Health Fund, No. 10-1669 
(SRC) (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (concerning allegedly improper underpayment of  
benefits under a self-funded welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA because the 
provider was not part of the plan’s preferred provider network); Montvale Surgical 
Ctr., LLC v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., No. 12-3685 (SRC) (D.N.J. 
Feb. 5, 2013) (concerning allegedly improper underpayment of benefits under a self-
funded welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA because the involved outpatient  
ambulatory surgery center was an “out of network” provider); Crescent City Surgical 
Ctr. Operating Co., LLC v. Humana Ins. Co., No. 16-3314 (E.D. La. June 22, 2016) 
(concerning the underpayment of an insurance claim by a self-funded health  
insurance plan to an acute care hospital that was out-of-network).  
336 See Biohealth Med. Lab., Inc. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:15-CV-23075-
KMM (S.D. Fla. 2016)  
(I hereby irrevocably assign to [the Laboratories] . . . all benefits 
under any policy of insurance, indemnity agreement, or any  
collateral source as defined by statute for services provided.  This 
assignment includes all rights to collect benefits directly from my 
insurance company and all rights to proceed against my insurance 
company in any action, including legal suit, if for any reason my  
insurance company fails to make payment of benefits due. This  
assignment also includes all rights to recover attorney’s fees and 
costs for such action brought by the provider as my assignee.). 
337 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  
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participant confers standing to sue on the participant’s behalf.338 
ERISA Section 206(d) prohibits assignment of benefits by a  
participant in the retirement plan context,339 but does not have a 
similar rule in the welfare plan context.340  Thus, in the latter 
context, whether the participant may assign his or her rights to 
an OON provider is a matter of plan design.341  Therefore, plan  
sponsors have begun inserting anti-assignment clauses to  
prevent the participant’s ability to assign his or her rights under 
the plan.342  The courts have consistently held that such  
anti-assignment provisions in ERISA healthcare plans are  
enforceable.343  In Griffin v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,344 Dr. 
Griffin sued Verizon’s health plan for ERISA claims of unpaid 
benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to provide plan 
documents, asserting standing under the participant’s  
                                                
338 See, e.g., Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 
99 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“A health care provider may have  
derivative standing to pursue ERISA benefits if he or she was assigned the right to 
reimbursement by an ERISA plan beneficiary.”).  
339 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).  
340 Id. at § 1056.  
341 See Lesser v. Hartford, No. 05 CIV. 3380 (MHD) at 7 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2006) 
(“welfare benefit plans are typically designed to ensure the ability of plan  
participants to obtain adequate health care or related benefits . . . [a]ssignment of 
such benefits . . . is thus fully consistent with [this] goal.”). 
342 See Torpey v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, No. 12-CV-7618 (JAP) (D.N.J. 
Jan. 30, 2014) (where the plan’s anti-assignment clause stated that “[r]ights and 
benefits under the Plan shall not be assignable, either before or after services and 
supplies are provided”). 
343 See Physicians Multispeciality Grp. v. Health Care Plan of Horton Homes, 
Inc., 371 F.3d 1291, 1294-96 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that unambiguous  
anti-assignment provisions in an ERISA governed welfare plan was valid and  
enforceable); City of Hope Nat’l Med Ctr. v. Health Plus Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 229 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (holding non-assignment of health care benefits under an ERISA welfare 
plan as valid “consistent with the other circuits which have addressed this issue”); 
St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d 1460, 
1464-65 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding an anti-assignment provision as that issue is 
subject “to the agreement of the contracting parties”); Davidowitz v. Delta Dental 
Plan of Cal., Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1478 (9th Cir. 1991) (enforcing an anti-assignment 
clause where the parties’ intent was clear); Washington Hosp. Ctr. Corp. v. Grp. 
Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.D.C. 1991) (upholding 
anti-assignment clause as it was not contrary to public policy).  But compare North 
Jersey Brain & Spine Center v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 2015)  
(granting standing to the provider pursuant to a patient’s assignment of benefits). 
344 No. 15-13525  (11th Cir. 2016).  
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assignment of benefits.345  While the court noted that ERISA 
does not prohibit a participant or beneficiary from assigning 
benefits to the provider, an anti-assignment provision in the 
plan that limited such assignments was valid and enforceable, 
thereby denying the healthcare provider standing to pursue an 
ERISA Section 502(a) cause of action.346 
Case law has also ruled against OON providers on the 
grounds that even if they had standing to pursue an ERISA 
cause of action, they did not exhaust the administrative claims 
process under ERISA.347 
These cases highlight that plan sponsors should insert anti-
assignment clauses in their ERISA welfare plans to prohibit a 
medical provider from asserting benefit claims and fiduciary 
breach claims against the plan.  Plan sponsors should also  
provide similar language in the SPD to alert participants of the 
plan’s anti-assignment provisions.  In the Griffin case discussed 
above, Dr. Griffin argued that Verizon could not rely on the anti-
assignment provision because it failed to notify her of the plan’s 
provision; Verizon was thus equitably estopped from relying on 
the provision or having waived it.348  While the court rejected 
that argument, explicit language in the SPD should prevent 
such an argument in the future.349 
D.    Statute of Limitations Provision 
Recent Supreme Court case law is instructive for drafting 
                                                
345 Id. at 3 (where the plan’s summery of coverage’s anti-assignment provision 
stated, “You cannot assign your right to receive payment to anyone else, except as 
required by a ‘Qualified Medical Child Support Order’ as defined by ERISA or any 
applicable state or federal law . . . The coverage and any benefits under the plan are 
not assignable by any covered member without the written consent of the plan . . .”).  
346 Id. at 4-5. 
347 See Biohealth Med. Lab. v. Conn., No. 1: 15-CV-23075-KMMM at 8 (S.D. Fla. 
2016); Riverview Health Inst. v. United Health Group, Inc., No. 15-CV-3604 at 8 (D. 
Minn. 2015). 
348 See Griffin, No. 15-13525 at 10. 
349 Id. 
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statute of limitations provisions within an ERISA plan.350  A 
statute of limitations sets forth a period of time for bringing  
certain types of causes of action.351  Under ERISA’s “Fiduciary 
Responsibility” section, the law sets forth a statute of limitations 
only for fiduciary breaches, prohibited transactions, and other 
provisions under Part Four of Title I of ERISA, including those 
brought under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).352  That limitation  
concludes “six years after [either] the date of the last action 
[that] constituted a part of the breach or violation, . . . or in the 
case of an omission[,] the latest date on which the fiduciary could 
have cured the breach of violation, or . . . three years after the 
earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
breach or violation[,]” whichever is earlier.353  A recent Supreme 
Court decision addressed the statute of limitations in the context 
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim involving a plan trustee’s  
continued holding of an imprudent investment.354  
There is no comparable statute of limitations period set 
forth under Part 5 of Title I relating to enforcement, namely the 
time period applicable for the filing of a cause of action for  
benefit claims under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) or non-fiduciary 
claims brought under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).355 
Most courts have applied the statute of limitations from 
analogous state laws in non-fiduciary claims.   The Eleventh  
Circuit borrowed a statute of limitations from the most  
analogous state law in the context of a plan pursuing  
reimbursement from a plan participant who had recovered  
                                                
350 See infra notes 369-379 and accompanying discussion. 
351 See Grell v. Laci Le Beau Corp., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1300, 1304-05 (1999).  
352 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (referring to actions with respect to a fiduciary’s breach of 
any responsibility, duty or obligation or with respect to a violation under Part 4 of 
ERISA). 
353 Id. (but cases of fraud or concealment result in a limitation period not later 
than six years after the discovery of the date of discovery of such breach or violation). 
354 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S.Ct. 1823, 1824 (2015) (reversing the Ninth  
Circuit’s holding that the statute of limitations began with in the trustee’s initial  
selection of the funds as ERISA requires the fiduciary to prudently monitor funds 
and remove those that become imprudent). 
355 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1151.  
KENNEDYFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:50  PM  
54      BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 18.1 
monies from a third party tortfeasor for injuries.356  The Eighth 
Circuit did the same in a similar ERISA Section 502(a)(3)  
context.357  The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as  
other lower courts, have used state law statute of limitations for 
non-fiduciary claims.358  The courts have also affirmed the use of 
an alternative period of time under the terms of the plan,  
provided such period is reasonable.359 
In non-fiduciary claims, the issue arises as to when the 
cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes.   
Normally, case law affirmed that a claim for benefit payments 
would accrue after the claim was submitted and formally denied 
because the plan requires the claimant to exhaust the claims 
procedures prior to initiating a lawsuit.360  The Supreme Court 
recently addressed this issue in the case of Heimeshoff v.  
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,361 which was a unanimous  
decision upholding the plan’s statute of limitations for benefit 
claims, including its claim accrual date, as long as it was  
                                                
356 See Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1356-57 (11th 
Cir. 1998). 
357 See Administrative Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare 
Plan v. Soles, 336 F.3d 780, 781 (8th Cir. 2003). 
358 Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Muir Co., 2 F.2d 
594, 598 (6th Cir. 1993) (a cause of action for delinquent employer contributions); 
Vernau v. Vic’s Mkt., 896 F.2d 43, 44-45 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Wyo. Laborers Health 
& Welfare Plan Trs. v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 615 (10th Cir. 
1988) (same); Campanella v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Plan, 299  
F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (a cause of action alleging plan violations of the 
participation and vesting requirements of ERISA); Gashlin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Ret. Sys. For U.S. Emps. & Special Agents, 286 F. Supp. 2d 407, 419 (D.N.J. 
2003) (a claim for equitable estoppel under ERISA § 502(a)(3)); Miele v. Pension Plan 
of N.Y. State Teamsters, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 88, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (a cause of action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief alleging the benefit formula violated the terms of 
the plan and ERISA); DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 Teamsters Pension Fund, 
975 F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (a cause of action alleging the Social Security 
offset to the plan formula violated ERISA), abrogated on other grounds by Dunnigan 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2002); Carollo v. Cement & 
Concrete Workers Dist. Council Pension Plan, 964 F. Supp. 677, 688 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(a cause of action alleging the plan’s accrual formula violated ERISA). 
359 See Harris v. The Epoch Grp., L.C., 357 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004)  
(permitting the plan’s use of a three-year statute of limitations or longer period of 
time under applicable law as valid). 
360 Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1980).  
361 134 S.Ct. 604, 610 (2013). 
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reasonable and there was no controlling state statute to the  
contrary.362  The disability plan in question required  
participants to bring suit within three years after “proof of loss” 
was due to the plan, which was defined as ninety days after the 
elimination period, the start of the period for which the insurer 
would owe payment.363  After being denied her claim, the  
plaintiff filed suit almost three years after the appeal denial, 
“but more than three years after ‘proof of loss’ was due.”364  The 
district court granted a motion to dismiss, relying on the statute 
of limitations provided by the closest state statute.365   
Connecticut law permitted the plan to specify a limitations  
period “as long as that period is not less than one year[,]” even if 
such period began to run before the claimant could bring legal 
action; thus, the court held the plan’s three-year limitations  
period was enforceable and Heimeshoff’s claim was untimely.366  
The Second Circuit affirmed.367  The Supreme Court “granted 
certiorari to resolve a split among the [circuits] [as to] the  
enforceability of this common contractual limitations  
provision.”368 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit.369  While 
statute of limitations normally begin to run when the cause of 
action “accrues” (i.e., when the plaintiff can file suit for a claim 
for benefits, which in the context of ERISA cases is when the 
plan issued a final denial), the Court rejected that such a rule 
should apply in the context of ERISA benefit claims.370  “Absent 
a controlling [state] statute to the contrary, a participant and a 
                                                
362 Id. at 608. 
363 Id.  
364 Id. at 609. 
365 Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 3:10-CV-1813 (D. Conn. 
Jan. 16, 2012). 
366 Id. at 7. 
367 Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 12-651-CV at 5 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
368  Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 610 (2013). 
369 Id. 
370 Id.  
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plan may [contractually agree] to a particular limitations period, 
even [if it begins] to run before the cause of action accrues,  
[provided] the time period is reasonable.”371  Quoting from its 
decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen,372 the Court stated 
that “‘[t]he plan, in short, is at the center of ERISA’” such that 
employers may draft the written terms of the plan so as to avoid 
the complexity of administrative or litigation costs.373  Hence, 
the parties may agree to the length of the limitations period, as 
well as its commencement.374  
The Court rejected the DOL’s argument in its amicus brief 
that a limitations period should not begin before the internal  
review is complete due to the potential of preventing judicial  
review.375  It held that its ruling did not undermine ERISA, as 
the parties both had an interest in participating in the  
administrative process, and if the parties acted in bad faith or 
delayed the process to avoid judicial review, the courts would 
have various means at their disposal, like waiver, estoppel, or 
tolling, to allow participants to proceed.376  The Court also  
rejected the argument that ERISA regulations require tolling of 
the limitations period during internal review.377  The only  
circumstance in which a plan must toll the limitations period is 
when the plan offers voluntary internal appeals beyond what is 
required under the regulations.378  Thus, the Court upheld the 
limitations period in question, as it was found to be reasonable 
and not in conflict with a controlling state statute.379 
Due to the flexibility provided by the Supreme Court, a plan 
sponsor should consider adopting a reasonable statute of  
                                                
371 Id. 
372 133 S.Ct. 1537 (2013). 
373 Heimeshoff, 134 S.Ct. at 611-12 (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 
133 S.Ct. 1537, 1548 (2013)). 
374 See id.  
375 Id. at 613-14. 
376 Id. at 615. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. 
379 Heimeshoff, 134 S.Ct. at 612. 
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limitations within its plan, including when the claim accrues.  
Having the limitations period begin before the participant’s 
cause of action accrues can be a powerful tool that the plan 
sponsor may utilize.  However, sponsors should consider having 
the period begin with a specific date rather than the plan’s final 
denial of the claim.  As a suggestion, if the statute of limitations 
period is not generous, it should be disclosed on the claims  
denial notice that is usually found within the “explanation of 
benefits” form. 
E.    Arbitration Clauses and Class Waivers 
ERISA Section 502(e)-(f) vests exclusive jurisdiction for 
ERISA causes of action in the federal courts.380  Such exclusive  
jurisdiction does not preclude the employer sponsor’s use of  
arbitration to resolve claims.381  The Supreme Court has  
routinely upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses, despite 
the disparities in bargaining power, as such clauses are viewed 
as a matter of contract.382  While these cases were not in the  
context of ERISA plans, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Heimeshoff would support a similar ruling, as it upheld a plan’s 
statute of limitations period as long as it was reasonable and not 
contrary to controlling state law.383  Lower courts in the ERISA 
context have upheld arbitration clauses in ERISA plans that  
involve benefit claims and statutory claims.384  They have also 
                                                
380 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)-(f) (with two exceptions for causes of action for benefit 
claims and for QMCSO compliance, in which state courts have concurrent  
jurisdiction).  
381 See Jillian Mech. Corp. v. United Serv. Workers Union Local 355, 882  
F. Supp. 2d 358, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing arbitration as an alternative to  
litigation in the ERISA context); see also Coker v. Transworld Airlines Inc., 957  
F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“ERISA was not intended to preempt the  
mandatory arbitration provisions of [other statutes].”).  
382 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011);  
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that 
“[t]he duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound 
by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.”). 
383 See supra Section IV.D. discussion and accompanying notes. 
384 See Comer v. Micor, 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the  
parties agreed that ERISA claims were arbitrable); Arnulfo P. Sulit v. Dean Witter 
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upheld the enforceability of an arbitration agreement’s  
prohibition on class arbitration or joinder of claims.385 
Plan sponsors should consider use of arbitration clauses in a 
plan document to expedite and reduce claim’s litigation costs.  
However, they may choose to make the plan’s arbitration  
provision discretionary on the part of the plan sponsor to limit 
judicial review of the arbitrator’s ruling.  The best practice 
would be to include mandatory arbitration provisions and  
prohibitions on class arbitrations or joinder of claims in both the 
plan document and the terms of the SPD. 
F.    Venue Provisions 
ERISA Section 502(e)(2) sets forth the applicable rules to  
determine the proper venue for a cause of action: (1) where the 
plan is administered; (2) where the breach occurred; or (3) where 
at least one defendant resides or is found.386  It is regarded as a 
liberal venue provision designed to provide easy and ready  
access to the federal courts.387  As such, it provides plaintiffs 
with options that could lead to “forum shopping” depending on 
the facts of the case and any split of authority with respect to a 
                                                                                                       
Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1988) (enforcing an arbitration  
agreement between a customer and securities broker, hired to manage its pension 
and profit sharing account, in any dispute arising under ERISA); Bird v. Shearson 
Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 
S.Ct. 289 (1991) (holding that ERISA was not intended to preclude arbitration of 
claims); Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1084 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding the 
plan’s arbitration clause binding with respect to ERISA benefit claims); and Pritzker 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
arbitration clauses binding on fiduciary breach claims under ERISA). 
385 See Jasso v. Money Mart Exp., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); Sanders v. Swift Tramp Co. of Ariz., LLC, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012); Luchini v. Carmax, No. CV F 12-0417 LJO DLB at 13 (E.D. Ca. July 23, 
2012); Tenet HealthSystem Phil., Inc. v. Rooney, No. 12-mc-58 at 5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 
2012); Hornsby v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-680-MHt at 5 
(M.D. Ala. June 13, 2012). 
386 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).  
387 Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing 
invocation of “ERISA’s liberal venue provision [which] was enacted to benefit plan 
participants/beneficiaries”).  
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given legal issue.388  An issue was raised as to whether the terms 
of the plan could dictate the venue that participants and  
beneficiaries would have to use in any cause of action against 
the plan.389  If possible, this could mitigate the plan sponsor’s 
costs of litigation.390 
The Sixth Circuit in the case of Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension 
Plan391 upheld the enforcement of the plan’s venue provision,  
despite the DOL’s arguments in its amicus brief to the  
contrary.392  In a claim for benefits, the plaintiff filed his cause of 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of  
Kentucky.393  The district court dismissed the complaint, as the 
plan’s venue provision required a participant or beneficiary to 
bring any action in connection with the plan in the federal  
district court in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where the plan was  
administered.394  The Sixth Circuit held that the DOL’s  
argument in its amicus brief that such venue selection clauses 
were “incompatible with ERISA” was not entitled to deference, 
as it was expressed solely in this amicus brief and another  
circuit-court amicus brief.395  As a result, the court found the 
plan’s venue selection clause to be “presumptively valid and  
                                                
388 Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules of 
Pursuing an ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REV. 329, 356 (2001) (discussing  
forum shopping resulting from ERISA section 502) (citing Wallace v. Am. Petrofina, 
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 829, 832 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Foster G. McGaw Hosp. of Loyola Univ. 
of Chicago v. Pension Trust Dist. #9 Welfare Trust I.A. of M.A.W., No. 92 C 4361, 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1992); Doe v. Connors, 796 F. Supp. 214, 222 (W.D. Va. 1992)).  
389 Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir. 2014), cert.  
denied, 136 S.Ct. 791 (2016). 
390 Smith, 769 F.3d at 932. 
391 Id.  
392 Id. 
393 Id. at 926. 
394 See Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, No. 3-120-CV-0697-H at 3 (W.D. Ky. 
Jan. 28, 2013). 
395 See Smith, 769 F.3d at 926-28 (stating that “the Secretary is no more expert 
than this Court is in determining whether a statute proscribes venue selection”)  
(referencing the DOL’s amicus brief in this case, Brief of the Sec’y of Lab. as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 
922 (6th Cir. 2014) (13-5492), and its prior amicus brief, see Brief of the Sec’y of Lab. 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Mozingo v. Trend Personnel Services, 504 
Fed. Appx. 753 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
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enforceable.”396  The court rejected the argument that its holding 
imposed an excessive burden on ERISA litigants by forcing them 
to exotic venues, as the “party may always challenge the  
reasonableness of a forum selection clause.”397 
Plan sponsors who opt to incorporate a specific venue  
selection clause should select a forum that best minimizes  
litigation over the question. 
G.    Reservation of Rights Clauses 
ERISA case law distinguishes a plan sponsor’s action as a 
settlor, as opposed to a fiduciary, for purposes of the fiduciary 
rules of ERISA Section 404(a)(1).398  When a plan sponsor acts as 
a settlor, its actions are not judged under the fiduciary  
standards and a plan sponsor can thus wear “two hats” with  
respect to a plan.399  In acting in its settlor capacity, a plan 
                                                
396 Id. at 930 (unless the enforcement of that clause would be unreasonable or 
unjust or the clause was invalid due to fraud or overreaching). 
397 Id. at 930 (citing its case in Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 828 (6th 
Cir. 2009), that set forth a three-part test to judge the enforceability of a forum  
selection clause).  The court states that the majority of courts have upheld the  
validity of venue selection clauses in ERISA plans, citing Bernikow v. Xerox Corp. 
Long-Term Disability Income Plan, CV 06-2612 RGK(SHx), (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006); 
Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008); Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 
519 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D. N.Y. 2007); Rodriguez v. PepsiCo Long Term Disability 
Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Rogal v. Skilstaf, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 
334 (E.D. Pa 2006); Schoemann ex rel. Schoemann v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 447 
F. Supp. 2d 1000 (D. Minn. 2006); Smith v. Aegon USA, LLC, 770 F. Supp. 2d 809 
(W.D. Va. 2011); Sneed v. Wellmark Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Iowa, No. 1:07-CV-
292, (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2008); Williams v. CIGNA Corp., No. 5:10-CV-00155, (W.D. 
Ky. Dec. 13, 2010), but see Coleman v. Supervalu, Inc. Short Term Disability  
Program 920 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill 2013); Nicolas v. MCI Health & Welfare Plan 
No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
398 See, e.g., Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 
679 (3d Cir. 1999) (“ERISA permits employers to ‘wear two hats,’” as plan  
administrator and as plan sponsor).  
399 Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 
2003) (“Accordingly, a plan sponsor is entitled to wear different hats: it may perform 
some functions as a fiduciary to the plan, while it may perform other functions on its 
own behalf, i.e., in a non-fiduciary capacity”); Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc. 220 F.3d 
702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We have recognized that employers who are also plan 
sponsors wear two hats: one as fiduciary . . . and the other as employer performing 
settlor functions . . . .”); Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[i]t is 
therefore perfectly consistent for an employer to wear ‘two hats’ and act both as a 
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sponsor is wearing its “sponsor hat,” and not acting as a  
fiduciary even though its actions affect the interests of the  
participants and beneficiaries.400  However, when the sponsor 
wears its “fiduciary hat,” it is subject to the fiduciary standards 
of ERISA.401  Thus, it becomes critical to determine the nature of 
the action taken by the plan sponsor to ascertain whether the 
action gives rise to fiduciary obligations.  
This distinction has been drawn in a trio of Supreme Court 
cases—Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,402 Lockheed Corp. 
v. Spink,403 and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson.404  In these 
cases, the Court affirmed the right of plan sponsors to terminate 
retiree welfare benefits,405 to amend a retirement plan to add 
early retirement benefits,406 and to use surplus assets under a 
defined benefit plan to fund benefits for a recently added group 
of participants.407  This may or may not include the sponsor’s  
decision regarding actual amendments or termination  
processes.408  However, the Court in the case of Varity Corp. v. 
Howe409 held that an employer’s misrepresentations to plan  
participants about the future of plan benefits was not protected 
as a settlor action, but instead was a fiduciary action.410 
The lower courts have applied the Supreme Court settlor 
rulings in a number of different contexts: where the employer 
                                                                                                       
fiduciary and as an employer without breaching fiduciary duties.”). 
400 Bennet, 168 F.3d at 679.  
401 Id.  
402 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). 
403 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996). 
404 525 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1999). 
405 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (referencing Adams v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 905 
F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990), which stated “[A] company does not act in a fiduciary 
capacity when deciding to amend or terminate a welfare benefits plan.”).  
406 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996). 
407 525 U.S. 432, 442 (1999). 
408 See Amato v. W. Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1417 (2d Cir. 1985)  
(deciding that an employer’s decision to recapture plan assets could be a fiduciary 
decision).  Dana M. Muir, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan  
Terminations and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1034, 1036 (1989). 
409 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
410 Id. at 503. 
KENNEDYFINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   1/25/17    2:50  PM  
62      BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 18.1 
amended the plan to eliminate or create benefits for different 
groups of employees;411 to set participant contributions or co-pay 
clauses under a health plan;412 to amend the plan to provide 
greater benefits for a limited group of participants;413 and to 
amend a pension plan to cause severed employees to be ineligible 
to receive unreduced early retirement benefits.414 
Plan sponsors can become fiduciaries when their  
responsibilities or actions make them a fiduciary.   In the Second 
Circuit’s decision in In re Citigroup ERISA Litig.,415 a plan  
sponsor of an Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 401(k) plan 
was not held to be a fiduciary for purposes of determining 
whether and how the company stock would be an investment  
option, because such authority had been delegated to the plan’s 
Investment and Administrative Committee, and there was no  
evidence that the sponsor retained or exercised such control.416  
However, a district court invalidated a plan sponsor’s  
amendment, eliminating Nabisco stock funds as an investment 
option under the plan on the grounds that a sponsor failed to  
follow the terms of the plan.417 
The lessons learned from previous litigation emphasize that 
the plan sponsor should make its settlor rights to amend,  
                                                
411 Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 2003); Anderson v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2002). 
412 Voyk v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 198 F.3d 599, 604-06 (6th Cir. 
1999).  But see Abbot v. Pipefitters Local 522, 94 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1996)  
(holding that trustees of a multiemployer welfare plan did act as fiduciaries in  
setting different contribution rates for different unions without amending the plan). 
413 See Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 678-
79 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding the employer’s amendment to the plan to allocate  
surplus to a given group of employees); Fletcher v. Kroger Co., 942 F.2d 1137, 1139-
40 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding an employer’s decision to provide early retirement  
benefits to a given group of employees); Belade v. ITT Corp., 909 F.2d 736, 737-38 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (upholding the exclusion of a given group of participants from early  
retirement benefits). 
414 See Schultz v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 948, 951-52 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
415 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011). 
416 In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 
sub nom. Gray v. Citigroup, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 475 (2012). 
417 Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1:02-CV-00373 (M.D.N.C. June 1, 
2011). 
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modify, or terminate the plan explicit, along with the processes 
associated with making those actions.  Plan sponsors should also 
refrain from using gratuitous recitals in the plan document  
because an adherence to ERISA’s fiduciary standards will avoid 
unfavorable court outcomes.418 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The case law makes it clear that plan documents contain 
numerous instruments that govern the plan.  Each instrument 
should have protective provisions within the plan document to 
better protect the plan sponsor and other fiduciaries.  ERISA 
Section 102(a) requires the SPD to be “written in a manner  
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and 
shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably 
apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and  
obligations under the plan.”419  This assumes that there are two 
documents—the plan document and the SPD.420  This may not 
be the case in the health and welfare context if a vendor-drafted 
booklet, rather than an SPD, explains the “terms of the plan.”  
As noted in the case law discussed above, the courts contemplate 
that a document can serve as both the ERISA plan document 
and the SPD, if the terms of the plan so provide.421  
 
 
                                                
418 See Boesel v. Chase Manhattan, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1032-34 (W.D.N.Y. 
1999) (where the court was inclined to favor the defendant’s plan interpretation to 
“all of the plan provisions”). 
419 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a). 
420 Tuttle, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 949 (discussing plan documents as a separate  
conceptual entity which may be comprised of portions of other documents); Frazier, 
725 F.3d at 566 (discussing plan documents as separate from plan assets before  
acknowledging that a single document may qualify as both).  
421 Liss v. Fidelity Employer Services Co., No. 11-2125 at 8 (6th Cir. 2013).  See 
also L & W Associates Welfare Ben. Plan v. Estate of Terance R. Wines, No. 12-CV-
13524 at 17 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014) (holding that the SPD is the plan document 
where no formal plan document exists) and Board of Trustees v. Moore, 800 F.3d 
214, 219 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that the SPD is a binding plan document that sets 
forth the enforceable subrogation terms). 
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